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Abstract
When two brands are perceived as closely associated with each other due to industry
membership, negative perceptions of and emotions towards the brand in crisis may transfer to
another brand, known as negative spillover effects. Negative spillover effects of one brand’s
crisis can often lead to undeserved losses in financial returns and reputation for the entire
industry or rival brands within the same industry. Spillover crises have been empirically
documented among various inter-organizational relationships. However, despite the importance
of understanding when a spillover crisis occurs and how to manage it, research in crisis
communications has paid relatively little attention to this topic. Existing studies are mostly
conceptual papers or case studies, and few empirical studies have investigated how a rival brand
can better manage a spillover crisis using different crisis response strategies.
The current study focuses on mitigating negative spillover effects within the same
industry due to a brand’s corporate ability crisis using crisis response strategies. Two
experiments were conducted to examine the efficacy of crisis response strategies (denial,
bolstering, and differentiation strategies) in mitigating negative spillover effects on rival brands
with different levels of attribute similarity to the brand in crisis. In particular, the study examines
the role of product/service attribute similarity in influencing negative spillover effects and the
efficacy of response strategies. The studies also investigated the mediating role of blame
attribution and attitudes towards the response message in the relationship of the three crisis
response strategies with brand attitudes and purchase intention.
The key findings from the two studies provide empirical evidence for a spillover crisis
within the same industry and the efficacy of crisis response strategies. To mitigate the negative
effects of spillover crises, issuing responses using the denial, bolstering, or differentiation
strategies performed better than no response in generating more favorable brand attitudes. The

findings show that for a high-similarity rival brand, it is better to use a differentiation strategy
than a bolstering strategy to lessen consumers’ perceptions of the similarity between the two
brands and highlight the differences between them. In contrast, it is better for low-similarity rival
brands to use the bolstering strategy than the differentiation strategy to reinforce people’s
perceptions that the two brands are different and avoid forming any unnecessary association. The
results also indicated that crisis response strategies have indirect effects on consumers’ brand
attitudes and purchase intention through blame attribution and attitudes toward the response
message. The results suggest that responding to a spillover crisis using either the bolstering or
differentiation strategy can reduce people’s blame attribution to the rival brand or increase
people’s favorable attitudes toward the message, which, in turn, can lead to more favorable brand
attitudes.
This research contributes to the public relations literature by potentially moving the
perspective of crisis communication from the crisis-stricken brand to its rival brands. In addition,
the study offers crisis communication professionals practical strategies for dealing with the brand
spillover crisis.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Conventional wisdom says the enemy of my enemy is my friend. The risks and
misfortune of one brand could be a great opportunity for rival brands. However, this wisdom
seems to overlook the risk that one brand’s crisis can pose to another brand in the same industry.
When two brands are perceived as closely associated with each other due to industry
membership, negative perceptions and emotions towards the brand in crisis may transfer to
another brand, known as a negative spillover effect (Ahluwalia et al., 2001; Lang & Stulz, 1992;
Laufer & Wang, 2018; Roehm & Tybout, 2006; Zhang & Lim, 2021; Zou et al., 2015). Public
relations researchers Veil and Dillingham (2020) call this type of crisis in one brand transferring
over to another a spillover crisis, and defined it as “events in an external organization create
concern, uncertainty, or perceptions of harm for another organization” (Veil et al., 2016, p. 317).
Spillover crises have been empirically documented among various inter-organizational
relationships (Barnett & King, 2008; Haack et al., 2014; Jonsson et al., 2009; Raufeisen et al.,
2019; Yu et al., 2008).
Several highly visible real-world cases illustrate this undesired but inevitable intraindustry contagion effect, such as the Costa Concordia cruise disaster (Tovrov, 2012). On the
evening of January 13, 2012, the cruise ship, Costa Concordia, collided with underwater rocks
and sank off the coast of Italy, killing 32 passengers. This disaster caused a huge financial loss
for its parent company Carnival Cruise Line as well as major competitors such as Royal
Caribbean. The demand for cruises fell sharply in the immediate aftermath of the disaster.
Industry observers testified that the disaster had destroyed the reputation of the whole industry
and caused the public to question the safety of the industry. It left an indelible stigma on the
industry as a whole (Tovrov, 2012).
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Another notable case of a brand crisis was the Volkswagen emission scandal dubbed
“Dieselgate” (Bouzzine & Lueg, 2020). The U.S Environmental Protection Agency revealed that
Volkswagen had intentionally programmed some cars sold from 2009-2019 to activate their
emissions controls only during testing but to deactivate it during real-world driving, and then
they fabricated the emission data (Mansouri, 2016). The scandal not only impacted the sales of
Volkswagen brands but also pulled down the sales of other German automotive companies by
5.2 billion in 2016 (Guest, 2019). At the time of the crisis, negative online discourse about
Volkswagen and related car brands poured in. The previously positive consumer comments on
Twitter toward other German automakers also turned very negative (Bachmann et al., 2019).
Bachmann and his colleagues (2019) found that the collective reputation of “German
engineering” created by German automakers through routine marketing activities formed a
natural and close reputation group for consumers. As a result, the Volkswagen scandal had a
strong negative spillover effect on the reputation and sales of its peer German carmakers.
Bouzzine and Lueg (2020) found that the rival brands suffered even greater financial damage
than the fraudulent firm.
As these examples illustrate, a spillover crisis often results in “unwarranted influence”
(Ouyang et al., 2020) or “undeserved loss” (Jonsson et al., 2009) in the financial returns and
reputations of the entire industry and rival brands within the same industry (Borah & Tellis,
2016; Cleeren et al., 2017; Huang & Li, 2009; Poroli & Huang, 2018; Raufeisen et al., 2019;
Roehm & Tybout, 2006; Veil & Anthony, 2017; Veil et al., 2016; Yu et al., 2008; Zhang & Lim,
2021). Scholars have long attempted to identify how to mitigate the unexpected and potentially
disruptive influences of a spillover crisis in marketing and management. Researchers have found
that diverse efforts have been made by competing brands to mitigate potential harm from a brand
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spillover crisis, including increasing advertising spends, lowering product prices, pursuing
ceremonial actions to manage media coverage (Desai, 2011; Zavyalova et al., 2012), and
establishing a self-regulatory institution in the industry (Barnett & King, 2008). These studies
provide evidence that managing a spillover crisis can help brands reduce financial loss, deflect
media and public attention, and restore reputational assets. At the industry level, good
management of a spillover crisis can also help the corresponding industry regain legitimacy and
enhance resilience (Barnett & King, 2008; Desai, 2011; Olsson, 2014; Zavyalova et al., 2012).
Research in crisis communications, however, has paid relatively little attention to this
topic. A commonly accepted view in practice is that brands should “lie low and avoid
comparison” (Borah & Tellis, 2016, p. 157) with the brand in crisis. When a brand is in trouble,
other competing brands tend to believe that it is better to avoid drawing undue attention from the
media. However, the “lie-low” strategy arguably becomes less effective to avoid the negative
impacts of others’ crises in this 24/7 digital and social media age. Crisis news can be easily
picked up by the public and create a flood of negative discussion on the Internet. Simply
avoiding media attention is not enough to prevent a brand from a spillover crisis. Poroli and
Huang (2018) argued that it is now somewhat common for the emotional public to exchange
news about a crisis and to extend the negative effects to other similar organizations. The stronger
the emotional reactions toward a brand in crisis through social media, the more likely it is that
negative emotions will spill over to other brands in the same industry, especially to a competing
brand that has a similar crisis attribute (i.e., the cause of the crisis). If the rival brand does not
respond to another brand’s crisis, it can lose the opportunity to control the narrative and frame
the crisis.
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Existing studies on spillover crises (Laufer & Wang, 2018; Roehm & Tybout, 2006; Veil
& Dillingham, 2020; Veil et al., 2016; Zhang & Lim, 2021) have predominantly focused on
conceptual and case studies. Some of these studies (Laufer & Wang, 2018; Veil & Dillingham,
2020) have described the complex nature of spillover crises and proposed feasible response
strategies at a conceptual level. For example, Veil et al. (2016) conducted a case study on how Jif
and Peter Pan peanut butter brands responded to the Peanut Corporation of America’s crisis
when it was found to be the source of a massive Salmonella outbreak. Based on this case, Veil et
al. proposed five response strategies: disassociation, denial, ingratiation, reminding, and
compensation. More recently, Veil and Dillingham (2020) discussed other spillover crisis case
analyses and recognized the complicated nature of spillover crises in various crisis situations.
Thus, they emphasized that the choice of response strategies should consider the distinct context
of the crisis.
Despite the previous work on spillover crisis responses, few empirical studies have
suggested how a competing brand can better manage an intra-industry spillover crisis using
different response messaging strategies. To the best of my knowledge, only two studies (Roehm
& Tybout, 2006; Zhang & Lim, 2021) have addressed this research problem. In a series of
experiments using real brand names, Roehm and Tybout (2006) focused on the role of attribute
similarity in a brand spillover crisis and examined the effectiveness of issuing a simple denial in
protecting brand beliefs and brand attitudes from a spillover crisis. For example, using Burger
King’s fictitious burger scandal, Roehm and Tybout tested the effect of Wendy’s denial strategy
(i.e., a rival brand with high attribute similarity) to protect its favorable brand attitudes and
beliefs. Although their research was pioneering, it is limited in that they only considered the
denial strategy as a potential response. More recently, Zhang and Lim (2021) proposed that two
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strategies, bolstering and differentiation, are best suited for rival brands to cut their association
with the brand in crisis. They compared the relative efficacy of the two strategies in protecting
brand attitudes and purchase intention depending on the rival brand’s market position. These
studies have laid the groundwork for further research on spillover crises and called for more
research on when spillover crises are likely to occur and how brands can effectively respond to
spillover crises.
Building on the previous research, the current research conducts two experiments to
examine the efficacy of theory-driven response messaging strategies during brand spillover
crises. The aim of this research is threefold. First, the current research aims to test the negative
spillover effects in the context of a brand crisis due to service failure. In contrast to previous
studies (e.g., Dahlén & Lange, 2006; Roehm & Tybout, 2006) that examined post-attitudes
towards a brand without having any control groups, this study compares consumers’ crisis
perceptions and negative emotions toward (1) a brand in crisis, (2) a competing brand in the
same industry, and (3) the same competing brand with no crisis news to examine negative
spillover effects. In doing so, the current research considers the role of perceived attribute
similarity between the rival brand and the brand in crisis because product/service attribute
similarity influences consumers’ perceptions of the association between the two brands. Second,
the current study compares the efficacy of denial, bolstering, and differentiation strategies with
no response in reducing the damage from the spillover effect on brand attitude and purchase
intention. This study further tests the relative efficacy of the bolstering and differentiation
strategies for rival brands at different levels of attribute similarity with the crisis-stricken brand.
Third, this research examines the mediating roles of blame attribution and attitudes toward the
response message in reducing the impact from the spillover effect. Building on previous
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research, I assume that the efficacy of response strategies in protecting rival brands from
negative spillover effects can be explained by lower blame attribution to the rival brand while
increasing favorable attitudes towards the response message.
The model in Figure 1 explains the process and potential impact of a brand spillover
crisis. The model includes key response strategies that a rival brand can employ depending on
the perceived association with the brand in crisis. The current study focuses on corporate ability
crises and the role of attribute similarity. Other factors in the model call for future research.
Figure 1
The Process Model of a Spillover Crisis Response

This research aims to contribute to the public relations field in the following aspects.
First, the study moves the perspective of crisis communication from a crisis-stricken brand to its
rival brands, which potentially broadens our understanding of the roles of public relations, in
general, and crisis communication, in particular. In doing so, this study aims to offer a theoretical
framework to understand the negative spillover effects. In addition, the study provides practical
strategies for crisis communication professionals who are dealing with a brand spillover crisis.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The literature review consists of four sections related to spillover crises. The first section
provides the theoretical background including a review of the prior research and literature on
brand spillover crises. The second section focuses on the literature providing theoretical and
managerial insights on crisis response strategies for managing spillover crises. The third section
reviews research on how different crisis response strategies can be used for brands with different
levels of attribute similarity. The final section reviews the literature explaining the underlying
mechanisms for the efficacy of two crisis response strategies as brands attempt to manage brand
spillover crises.
Spillover Crises
Defining Brand Crisis
A brand’s image and sales can be affected by not only its own but also competitors’ bad
news, such as safety recalls or food-borne illnesses. A brand crisis is a threat to brand operations
and brand equity resulting in short-term stock price declines, a surge in negative publicity,
ongoing financial burden, and even long-term damage to a brand’s reputation and image
(Coombs, 2007). Brand crisis is a frequent topic in management, marketing, and public relations,
but scholars in these three fields have proposed different definitions that highlight the different
characteristics of a crisis (see Table 1).
Table 1
Selected Definitions of a Crisis
Source

Definition

Pearson and Clair (1998, p. 60) “A low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the
viability of the organization and is characterized by
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ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well
as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly.”
Seeger et al. (1998, p. 233)

“A specific, unexpected, and non-routine event or series of
events that create high levels of uncertainty and threat or
perceived threat to an organization’s high priority goals.”

Fearn-Banks (2002, p. 2)

“A major occurrence with a potentially negative outcome
affecting the organization, company, or industry, as well as
its publics, products, services, or good name.”

Coombs (2010, p. 19)

“An unpredictable event that threatens important
expectancies of stakeholders and can seriously impact an
organization’s performance and generate negative outcome.”

Bundy et al. (2017, p. 1663)

“An event perceived by managers and stakeholders to be
highly salient, unexpected, and potentially disruptive.”

James et al. (2011, p. 461)

“A threat of such magnitude that it can potentially hinder a
stated goal or objective; marked by a short decision time;
evoke an element of surprise.”

Williams et al. (2017, p. 737)

“Processes extended in space and time, where a ‘triggering
event’ is the result of a long period of incubation.”

Ihlen (2002, p. 186)

“An event that brings, or has potential for bringing, an
organization into disrepute, which could imperil an
organization’s future profitability, growth, and, possibly, its
survival.”

Table 1 illustrates the key characteristics of a crisis. First, a crisis hinders or disrupts an
organization’s ongoing and routine operations and its ability to achieve its stated and prioritized
goals. Second, a crisis often occurs unexpectedly and surprisedly making it difficult for an
organization to predict the nature, magnitude, and timing of a crisis. Third, a crisis can have
serious consequences that greatly harm or threaten the financial, reputational, and relational
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interests of an organization and its stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, employees, industry). Fourth,
a crisis is accompanied by ambiguity, uncertainty, and perceived vulnerability (Sellnow et al.,
2009). For stakeholders and the public, there is a lack of clarity about what the cause of the crisis
is, who should be blamed, and how it will affect them. For brands in crisis, there is also
ambiguity about how the crisis will unfold, how much impact it will have, and what actions
should be taken to appropriately address the crisis given that everything is in flux and is
uncertain. Last, the crisis leaves a short decision time for brands to react. A brand should
promptly respond to the crisis by providing the information needed to adapt and take corrective
actions to help the publics protect themselves from and cope with the crisis, in addition to
managing the brand’s reputation and image (Bundy et al., 2017; Coombs, 2007; Seeger et al.,
1998; Sturges, 1994). The current study adopts Coombs’s (2010, p. 19) definition of a crisis: “an
unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and can seriously
impact an organization’s performance and generate negative outcomes.”
Scholars have identified two streams of research regarding a crisis (Jaques, 2009;
Williams et al., 2017). One is crisis-as-an-event (Coombs, 2007; Coombs, 2015; Fearn-Banks,
2002; Sohn & Lariscy, 2014), and the other is crisis-as-a-process (Roux-Dufort, 2007;
Shrivastava, 1993). Researchers focusing on the crisis-as-an-event emphasize the triggering
event of the crisis and examine how the event threatens organizational legitimacy. This stream of
research suggests that crises are “contingencies isolated in space and time” (Williams et al.,
2017, p. 737), and are therefore unexpected and unpredictable. In contrast, researchers focusing
on the crisis-as-a-process perspective take a multi-staged approach to analyze a crisis. They
assume that a crisis develops in several phrases, including “warning signals, acute stage,
amplification and resolution” (Roux-Dufort, 2007, p. 109) or “pre-event, in-event, and post-
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event” (Coombs, 1999). This stream of research emphasizes the need to understand the long
crisis-incubation process, crisis evolution, and the best organizational practices at different stages
of a crisis.
Based on different dimensions, a brand crisis can be classified in various ways. For
example, Coombs (2007) proposed three crisis types ranked by crisis responsibility from small to
large. The three types are victim crisis (i.e., natural disasters), accidental crisis (i.e., technical
error), and preventable crisis (i.e., human error). Gundel (2005) based on the predictability and
influence possibility of a crisis. They also proposed four types of crises: conventional,
unexpected, intractable, and fundamental crises.
A crisis can also be labeled based on the outcomes of a crisis, such as a reputational crisis
(Sohn & Lariscy, 2014; Zyglidopoulos & Phillips, 1999), which deteriorates a brand’s
reputation. Sohn and Lariscy (2014) proposed two types of reputation crises: corporate ability
crisis (CA crisis hereafter) and corporate social responsibility crisis (CSR crisis hereafter). Sohn
and Lariscy (2014) defined a CA crisis as “a critical event that adversely affects reputation
associated with expertise of product and service,” and a CSR crisis as “a major event that poses a
threat to reputation associated with norms and values cherished by society, and socially expected
obligations” (Sohn & Lariscy, 2014, p. 27). CA crises are caused by failing to provide the quality
products and services the brand promised, and CSR crises are caused by failing to meet social
obligations expected by a brand’s stakeholders (Chen & Tao, 2020). Based on these definitions,
performance-related crises can be considered CA crises, such as product-harm crises and servicefailure crises. In contrast, value-related crises are CSR crises. For example, Peloton’s treadmill
recall due to a safety issue and Wells Fargo’s cross-selling scandal were CA crises, whereas Papa
John’s crisis from its CEO’s racial slur was a CSR crisis.
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Defining Spillover Crises
Spillover effects are not a novel phenomenon as scholars from management and
marketing have long studied the spillover phenomenon in crises. A variety of terms have been
proposed to describe this phenomenon, including image or stigma transfer (Heslop et al., 2013;
Kahuni et al., 2009), crisis contagion (Bouzzine & Lueg, 2020; Laufer & Wang, 2018; Zou et al.,
2015), contamination of misconduct (Paruchuri & Misangyi, 2015), tarred with the same brush
(Barnett & Hoffman, 2008), negative spillover effects (Roehm & Tybout, 2006; Zhang & Lim,
2021), and guilt by association (Barlow et al., 2018; Carrillat et al., 2014). In crisis
communications, this phenomenon is called a spillover crisis (Veil & Dillingham, 2020). Table 2
presents selected definitions of spillover effects and a spillover crisis.
Table 2
Selected Definitions of Spillover Crisis/Effects
Source

Definition

Ahluwalia et al. (2000, p. 458)

(Spillover effects) “The extent to which a message
influences beliefs related to attributes that are not
contained in the message.”

Raufeisen et al. (2019, p. 249)

(Spillover effects) “A change in beliefs regarding one
entity due to the evaluation of another associated
entity.”

Paruchuri and Misangyi (2015, p. 169) (Spillover effects) “Investors generalize the
culpability to the industry category and perceive the
instantiation of generalized culpability within the
industry bystander firms.”
Poroli and Huang (2018, p. 1132)

(Spillover Crisis) “When publics’ members
belonging to the non-culpable organization perceive
their organization as also being subject to a
problem.”

12

Veil et al. (2016, p. 317)

(Spillover Crisis) “Events in an external organization
create concern, uncertainty, or perceptions of harm
for another organization.”

Veil et al. defined spillover crises as “events in an external organization [that] create
concern, uncertainty, or perceptions of harm for another organization” (Veil et al., 2016, p. 317).
This definition follows the definition of a brand crisis that emphasizes the defining
characteristics of a crisis to show that spillover is a distinct type of crisis. It also emphasizes the
source of the crisis, which is an event caused by another organization. However, this definition
does not adequately capture the nature and process of the spillover phenomenon in which there is
a transfer of the evaluation of one organization or brand to another brand.
The current study clarifies the definition of a spillover crisis. In this study, a brand
spillover crisis is defined as a crisis that occurs when the perceptual and emotional evaluation of
a brand in crisis is transferred to adjacent or competing brands within the same industry. A brand
spillover crisis is an unanticipated situation for brands that threatens the brands’ high-priority
values and leaves them with a limited reaction time (Hermann, 1963). A brand spillover crisis is
a secondary crisis caused by the negative spillover effects of another brand’s crisis. It is a byproduct of someone else’s crisis for which the brand in a spillover crisis bears no or less
responsibility. In previous studies, the brand suffering from negative spillover effects is often
called the innocent brand (Jonsson et al., 2009) or by-stander firm (Paruchuri & Misangyi, 2015).
In contrast, the brand responsible for the original crisis is called the culpable brand, perpetrator
firm (Paruchuri & Misangyi, 2015), crisis-plagued firm (Norheim-Hansen & Meschi, 2020), or
crisis-stricken brand (Poroli & Huang, 2018; Zhang & Lim, 2021).
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Different Types and Outcomes of a Brand Spillover crisis
Scholars have documented various types of negative spillover effects. Figure 2 illustrates
the spillover effects due to different types of associations between two entities. From the inner
circles to the outside circle in Figure 2, negative effects can spill from an attribute of a
product/service to another, from a product/service to another product/service within the brand,
from a brand to another brand with the same parent company, or a brand in the same industry.
Negative effects can also spill over to a partnership between two brands, between a company and
nonprofit organization, and between a celebrity and an endorsed brand. The stronger the
perceived association between two entities, the higher the likelihood of a negative spillover
effect.
Figure 2
Spillover Effects for Different Types of Associations

As Figure 2 illustrated, a common brand spillover effect is at the attribute level (i.e.,
within a product or service). For example, Ahluwalia et al. (2001) found that a negative message
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about an attribute of a fictitious brand of athletic shoes negatively impacted people’s perceptions
of other attributes that were associated with the target attribute but not mentioned in the message.
Researchers have also found that negative spillover effects can occur at the
product/service level within the same brand or brand extensions (Balachander & Ghose, 2003;
Barlow et al., 2018; Boisvert & Ashill, 2018; John et al., 1998; Lane & Fastoso, 2016; Laufer &
Wang, 2018; Milberg et al., 1997; Morrin, 1999; Pina et al., 2013). Balachander and Ghose
(2003) named the spillover from a parent brand to other brand extension and from a brand
extension to the parent brand a forward spillover effect and a reciprocal spillover effect,
respectively. John et al. (1998) explored the negative spillover effect from normal brand
extensions to a flagship product. They suggested that it was difficult for the flagship product to
avoid negative spillover from the line extension if the flagship product and extension were
perceived as closely associated. Boisvert and Ashill (2018) also examined spillover effects from
different downward line extensions (i.e., direct downward brand, direct horizontal brand, subbrand, and standalone) on U.S consumers’ attitudes towards a French luxury parent brand. Based
on the notion of category stigma, Barlow, Verhaal, and Hoskins’ study (2018) showed that a
brand offering a product in a stigmatized category (i.e., U.S. beer industry) resulted in lowering
the evaluations of the product and other products of the brand.
Negative evaluations can also spill over from one brand to another brand within the same
product or service category (Borah & Tellis, 2016; Dahlén & Lange, 2006; Janakiraman et al.,
2009; Roehm & Tybout, 2006; Veil et al., 2016; Yu et al., 2008; Zhang & Lim, 2021). In a
conceptual paper, Laufer and Wang (2018) argued that if a brand and a crisis-stricken brand were
in the same industry or employed a similar positioning strategy, the non-stricken brand would
have a higher risk of a spillover crisis. Roehm and Tybout (2006) tested the negative spillover
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effects from a scandalized brand to its product category and competing brands in a hypothetical
product-harm crisis in the fast-food industry. They suggested that the extent to which a rival
brand experiences a spillover crisis would depend on how much its brand attributes were similar
to the brand in crisis. Zhang and Lim (2021) found that a milk brand’s product-harm crisis due to
a food-borne illness increased the perceived risk of milk products in general. Seo et al. (2014)
also performed a time series analysis of Jack in the Box’s stock prices after several food
contamination crises in the fast-food industry from 1994 to 2020. They found that Jack in the
Box’s stock price fell each time another fast-food chain had a food-borne illness crisis, inferring
that there was a never-ending stigma transfer from Jack in the Box’s ill-managed E. coli crisis in
1993.
A brand alliance can also cause negative spillover effects (Bourdeau et al., 2007;
Norheim-Hansen & Meschi, 2020; Simonin & Ruth, 1998; Votola & Unnava, 2006). A brand
alliance is a strategic alliance to increase the brand’s value (Washburn et al., 2000) and can be
formed in the same product category or across different industries. Votola and Unnava (2006)
examined negative spillover effects in a product-level alliance and a marketing level alliance and
found that if the host brand was perceived as culpable for the partner brand’s failure, a negative
spillover effect occurred from the partner brand to the host brand. They further examined
negative spillover effects caused by two different types of brand failure: incompetence and
immorality. Their study showed that failure due to incompetence had more negative impacts on a
marketing-level brand alliance, whereas failure due to immorality caused more harm for brands
in a product-level brand alliance. Bourdeau et al. (2007) focused on negative spillover effects in
a service brand alliance. In contrast to a product brand alliance, services provided by brands in a
service alliance may strongly rely on each other and, together, form a seamless experience
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serving the customer’s specific needs. The study indicated that the partner’s service quality
generated a positive spillover effect for the primary service provider. However, since the services
were closely related, failure of the partner’s service equally impacted the primary service
provider.
Negative spillover effects have also been found within a supply chain (Huang &
Radighieri, 2020), between a celebrity and the endorsed brand (Carrillat et al., 2014; Sato et al.,
2019; Thomas & Fowler, 2016), within corporate sponsorship (Kahuni et al., 2009), within a
nonprofit organization-company partnership (Lee & Rim, 2017), and from an employee to the
entire company (Antonetti & Valor, 2020). For example, Huang and Radighieri (2020) examined
spillover crises for manufacturers caused by suppliers’ product quality problems. They found
that if a foreign supplier rather than a domestic supplier was blamed for the product recall,
people’s purchase intention toward the products from the manufacturer dropped significantly.
Antonetti and Valor (2020) examined emotional spillovers from an employee’s unethical
wrongdoing and found that people’s anger towards the employee would spill over to the
company.
Theoretical Background
A spillover effect is a two-step cognitive process that includes “the retrieval of related
nodes and their updating” (Lei et al., 2008, p. 112) involving both memory activation and
memory renewal. In particular, the perceived associations between the mental representations
have been suggested as the focal factor to understand this process. According to Raufeisen et al.
(2019), two important questions to understand spillover effects are how mental associations are
formed and how attributes are transferred based on the association. They suggested that the
former is explained by associative network theory (Anderson, 1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975) and
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categorization theory (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Loken & Ward, 1990), while the latter is explained
by the accessibility-diagnosticity framework (Feldman & Lynch, 1988). Based on these
theoretical origins, this section begins with the mental representations and associations between
them.
Mental Representation. Mental representation refers to a hypothetical internal
representation of external reality, which is formed by people’s encoded information about
objects, persons, and events and such information is stored in a network of connections in their
minds (Smith, 1998). This mental representation can be retrieved to help people make sense of
the world. In the memory network, the mental representation of a specific object is
conceptualized as a node. Carlston and Smith (1996) pointed out that these hypothetical nodes
are interconnected in three ways: associative networks, schema, and exemplars. They suggested
that the associative network is a “bottom-up” model of knowledge representations (p. 12), which
does not have a clear internal structure among the nodes. The associative network assumes that
information is not directly stored if it can be inferred through associative connections. In
contrast, schemas represent a “top-down” model with an explicit hierarchical structure of mental
representations. When information has enough features that match an existing schema in
people’s mind, the schema will be retrieved and used to understand the incoming information
and guide inferences. Unlike the methods of schema and the associative network, the exemplar
model assumes that an episode is a unit of people’s memory. People store a specific experience
instead of abstract information about a specific experience. When more general information is
needed, people retrieve many individual exemplars (i.e., unconnected traces stored in people’s
memory) and make inferences about them.
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Another important component of the memory network is the hypothetical links called
associations that connect one node to another. The characteristics of a node and the relationship
to other nodes can be described by the number, valence, uniqueness, and source of the
associations (Krishnan, 1996). The greater the number of associations, the more accessible a
node is in people’s mind. Accessibility refers to the ease and readiness with which specific
information can be retrieved from memory. The influence of nodes depends on the accessibility
because only accessible information plays a crucial role in constructing judgments and
performing behaviors. Furthermore, an association between two nodes is directional and
valenced (Krishnan, 1996; Lei et al., 2008). The strength of the association from node A to node
B may differ from the strength of the association from node B to node A. In addition, two nodes
can be positively or negatively associated. In the context of people’s brand knowledge, a brand,
product, or attribute of a product is represented as a node in people’s mind. The relationship
between two nodes (e.g., within the same industry, in a supply chain) determines the strength and
valence of the associations between the nodes. If a brand is a prototype for a specific product
category, the node that represents the brand will have many associations in common with other
nodes that represent brands in the same category. People learn the associations among brands by
their direct experience (e.g., trial, use) and indirect experience with brands (e.g., advertising,
word-of-mouth).
Associative Network Theory. Associative network theory explains how information is
stored and retrieved from memory (Anderson, 1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975). The theory
assumes that mental representation is organized and structured as a connective network in a
person’s mind. The perceived similarity is the primary reason they form perceptual connections
among objects. However, it is not the only way. Perceptual connections can also be established
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by other means, such as repeatedly pairing two objects. The retrieval of information stored in
their memory involves a process of activation and activation spreading. An external cue can
activate the nodes that represent the related information or objects, and once a node is activated
in the network, the activation can travel to other connected nodes. The association strength
between two nodes positively influences the likelihood of activation spreading (Anderson, 1983;
Collins & Loftus, 1975). If the activation strength is beyond the threshold level of a node, the
node will be activated and may continue spreading activation to other related nodes. The
properties of associations, such as the uniqueness and source, determine the strength of the
association. For example, if the association between two nodes is learned from a person’s direct
experience, the likelihood of activating one node leading to activating another node is high. High
perceived similarity of two nodes results in a stronger association, thereby increasing the
activation of associated nodes. With activation spreading, the network enables the transfer of
attributes between mentally associated objects. If an association exists, people may adjust their
attitudes towards two associated nodes or use one node as the reference to understand the other
for cognitive efficiency, the need for causal explanations, or the preference for a harmonious
state.
Categorization Theory. Categorical thinking is how individuals make sense of the world
(Turner, 2010). A category is a group of objects, individuals, organizations, or events that share
sets of attributes. In other words, shared attributes represent a sense of similarity that defines a
specific category. People use pre-existing categorical representations to reduce cognitive
complexity and increase the cognitive efficiency of learning and understanding social
information (Loken et al., 2008). Specifically, when encountering a new stimulus (i.e., objects,
individuals, brands), people will attempt to assign it to a pre-existing category. The match with
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an existing categorical representation enables people to draw on their knowledge of typical
attributes of category members to provide default assumptions about the encounter (Fiske, 1993).
More importantly, people will make use of the stored categorical knowledge to make inferences
about what they are not sure about the new encounter and even make evaluative judgments about
the new encounter (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1997). Category representation provides a stable
foundation for people to process information and indicate a level of flexibility. which helps them
better adapt to their ever-changing environment (Loken et al., 2008).
Category inferences are the fundamental use of categories to understand new encounters,
but this cognitive process depends on whether a category can be activated by external cues and
reach a certain activation threshold (Moskowitz, 2005). The most critical factor that determines
this activation is the similarity or match between the category and the new item (Aaker & Keller,
1990). The similarity serves as a heuristic that simplifies the judgment and decision-making
about the new items based on the information of the category. If the similarity between a
category and a new item is high, the likelihood of a category-based inference is high.
Accessibility-Diagnosticity Framework. The accessibility-diagnosticity framework
provides a theoretical basis to explain how people’s evaluative judgments regarding one entity
can be shaped by other mentally connected entities. Accessibility refers to the ease and readiness
with which information can be retrieved from memory. Diagnosticity refers to the extent to
which people perceive that the information regarding one entity can correctly infer the missing
information of another entity or help them make judgments about another entity (Feldman &
Lynch, 1988). The accessibility-diagnosticity framework suggests that people are likely to use
their perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes toward one brand to construct judgments and evaluations
about another brand when two objects are closely associated with each other. In Feldman and
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Lynch (1988) original research regarding measurement, they found that people treated the
answers to earlier questions as the basis for their subsequent judgement if the earlier answers met
the accessibility and diagnosticity conditions. The subsequent responses were “computed” from
the prior responses even if they were not directly retrieved from memory. Additionally, negative
information is generally perceived as more diagnostic than positive information (Ahluwalia et
al., 2001; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989).
The accessibility-diagnosticity framework somewhat reflects the heuristic and sufficient
principle that people often practice in making a judgment. In most cases, people neither attempt
to retrieve all the information they know about an object or a person nor do they carefully
process the information. Instead, they only retrieve a subset of the related information that is
perceived as sufficient to make a decision. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) stated that constructing a
judgment often “depends less on the entire repertoire of people’s knowledge and more on which
aspects of their knowledge happen to come to mind” (p. 64). Therefore, the information that is
more readily retrieved at the moment has more influence on the decision than less accessible
information (Shrum, 2009).
Spillover Crisis Explained. According to these theories, brand spillover crises can be
explained as follows. When exposed to crisis news or negative information about a brand, people
try to understand the crisis event. The salient attributes of the brand in the scene will activate
other related mental representations, and the activation will spread to the entire memory network
until it fades away. The salient attribute that is perceived as the cause of the crisis is called a
crisis attribute (Roehm & Tybout, 2006) and is used as a diagnostic cue to evaluate not only the
crisis-stricken brand but also to evaluate other brands based on their previous experience. For
instance, news about a food-borne illness may remind people of previous cases, such as in the
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Jack in the Box E-coli case (Seo et al., 2014) or the contaminated romaine lettuce case (Gray,
2018). Each of these cases and brands are often connected in people’s mind and can be
reactivated whenever there is a similar case. When a crisis-triggering attribute activates other
connected nodes and the attribute is retrieved based on people’s knowledge and experience, the
related nodes are likely to be influenced by the crisis. The strength of the association between
two brands determines the accessibility of one brand in people’s mind during the brand crisis.
The stronger association between a rival brand and the brand in crisis, the faster it will be
retrieved in people’s memory. The strength also influences the diagnosticity of one brand when
people make a judgment about another brand (Feldman & Lynch, 1988). People will engage in
diagnostic processing based on the crisis attribute for rival brands that have a strong association
with the brand in crisis. Diagnostic processing helps people infer the risks of rival brands,
especially in an uncertain an ambiguous crisis. For example, because the diagnosticity of
romaine lettuce is high for other green vegetables, when there was a romaine lettuce E. coli
outbreak in Yuma (Gray, 2018), people avoided purchasing other green vegetables until the FDA
identified the source of the risk and narrowed it down to the impacted areas. Based on
categorization, association judgement is usually based on the similarity (Punj & Moon, 2002).
The perceived similarity in various aspects, such as product attributes, industry membership,
organizational structure, or positioning strategy (Laufer & Wang, 2018), determine the strength
of the association. A few researchers (Ahluwalia et al., 2001; Lei et al., 2008) have relied on the
accessibility and diagnosticity framework to explain the process of spillover crises.
Spillover Crisis Within the Same Industry
Building on the theoretical background, this research demonstrates whether attribute
similarity causes a negative spillover effect in a CA crisis. Brands in the same product/service
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category have some common attributes. Perceived similarity in product/service attributes
between two brands influences how people perceive and evaluate the related brands during a
brand crisis and brand consumption (Broniarczyk & Alba, 1994; Janakiraman et al., 2009;
Roehm & Tybout, 2006). When purchasing a product, a consumer makes a comparison based on
the accessible information in their memory. For instance, before buying organic milk, a
consumer may mentally compare the brand with other brands based on common attributes such
as the price, sugar, grass-fed dairy, or lactose-free. When exposed to news about an organic
brand’s food-borne illness, a consumer may also use the common attributes and the crisistriggering attribute to make a situational judgment for further consideration. As such, the greater
the attribute similarity between the crisis-stricken brand and rival brand, the greater the negative
spillover effect. Previous studies have suggested that attribute similarity is a crucial determinant
of negative spillover effects (Borah & Tellis, 2016; Dahlén & Lange, 2006; Janakiraman et al.,
2009; Roehm & Tybout, 2006; Sahni, 2016; Wu et al., 2020; Yu et al., 2008). In a study about
the banking industry, Dahlén and Lange (2006) found that an online bank’s crisis lowered brand
attitudes, brand trust, and brand choice of other online banks and increased the perceived risk of
the entire banking industry. They suggested that the magnitude of the negative spillover effect
was determined by the similarity between the crisis-stricken brand and the rival brand. Likewise,
Janakiraman et al. (2009) provided evidence that the perception of a spillover between two
brands depended on whether the brands were highly similar. Roehm and Tybout (2006)
empirically found that a negative spillover effect occurred when the scandalized brand was very
typical of the business category while the rival brand had high-attribute similarity with the
scandalized brand. Borah and Tellis (2016) analyzed the negative online discourse of four
automobile brands and their 48 models when car recalls were frequent. They found that the
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negative discussion of a particular car model in one brand increased the negative discussion of
similar models of other brands in the same product segment.
It is worth noting that this research focuses only on CA crises including product-harm
crises and service failure crises. Product-harm crises are defined as “discrete, well-publicized
occurrences wherein products are found to be defective or dangerous” (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000,
p. 215). Service-failure crises are caused by “a private service performance that falls below the
expectation of one or a few customer(s)” (Khamitov et al., 2020, p. 520). Laufer and Coombs
(2006) claimed that CA crises are common for a brand, and their occurrence is just a matter of
time. When a CA crisis occurs, the negative perceptional and emotional changes in brand
evaluations spill from the crisis-stricken brand to its rival brands and even to the entire industry.
Veil et al. (2016) supported this claim based on a case study of the 2009 Peanut Corporation of
America’s (PCA) salmonella contamination crisis and the related spillover crises hitting the three
top-selling U.S. peanut butter brands: Jif, Skippy, and Peter Pan. Through their analysis of the
media coverage related to the crisis and the three brands, they concluded that the PCA crisis
threatened the organizational legitimacy of the entire peanut industry. Gao et al. (2015) also
demonstrated the distrust spillover effect across the Chinese dairy industry after the 2008 milk
contamination crisis. They also tested the effect of perceived crisis severity on the magnitude of
negative spillover effects. Poroli and Huang (2018) investigated the negative spillover effects of
another crisis in a Hong Kong university due to its green roof collapse. They conducted in-depth
interviews with students in another Hong Kong university and found that the original crisis
negatively changed the perceptions of green roofs among the students and increased their
concerns about the safety of green roofs on their own campus. Thus, this study proposes H1 to
H3 were proposed as follows.
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H1: Participants exposed to crisis news will have (H1a) a greater perceived crisis and (H1b)
negative emotions toward the rival brand with high attribute similarity compared to those who
are not exposed to crisis news.
H2: Participants exposed to crisis news will have (H2a) a greater perceived crisis and (H2b)
negative emotions toward a rival brand with low attribute similarity compared to those who are
not exposed to crisis news.
H3: Participants exposed to crisis news will generate (H3a) a greater perceived crisis and (H3b)
more negative emotions toward a rival brand with high similarity than a rival brand with low
similarity.
Crisis Response Strategies and Managing Spillover Crises
The uniqueness of a spillover crisis is that the crisis is not caused by a production defect,
an operation failure, or unethical conduct on the part of the rival brand itself, but by the
perceived associations with other brands in deep crisis. These associations that are actively
established or formed passively cannot be easily avoided. No brands are free from spillover
crises. Thus, brands should be prepared to manage spillover crises for four reasons. First, the
potential adverse changes in people’s perceptual and emotional evaluations during a spillover
crisis require that the brand take quick action to protect the brand. Second, empirical studies
(Shin et al., 2016; Veil & Dillingham, 2020; Veil et al., 2016) have shown that spillover crises
can be managed by proactively preparing responses to potential crises. For example, in a quasiexperimental study, Shin and her colleagues (2016) investigated how the national headquarters
of a restaurant franchise could reduce the negative influence of a spillover crisis due to employee
misbehavior in one of its local chains. They found that the national franchisor effectively
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reduced the loss of brand trust and brand avoidance by explicitly stressing the independent
ownership of the local chain in the statement.
Third, proactive responses give brands the opportunity to shape the narrative of the crisis
(Veil & Dillingham, 2020). In general, crisis communication research suggests that a crisis is so
complex that the public is not able to identify the culpable organization. Coombs and Holladay
(1996) noted that “A crisis event is subject to interpretation” (p. 283). Therefore, as
demonstrated by Domino’s YouTube crisis, communication is needed to convince “an alarmed
public that the organization has made a substantial response to an unsubstantiated claim” (Veil et
al., 2012, p. 330). Through an effective crisis response, crisis communication professionals can
provide “frames of reference” for people to think about a brand or a crisis (Hallahan, 1999). This
opportunity to frame the message and the crisis allows brands to set the tone for coverage of the
crisis and direct the publics’ attention to the brand’s preferred aspects of reality (Hallahan, 1999;
Williams & Treadaway, 1992). Specifically, crisis managers can shape people’s perceptions of
who is responsible for the crisis, create positive associations, or reduce the negative associations
with other beliefs or entities. Last, in a broader sense, responding to a spillover crisis may
enhance the resilience of the industry and lead to an evolution of the industry (e.g., new industry
safety protocols) to prevent member brands from becoming involved in the same crisis in the
future (Yu et al., 2008). For these reasons, a rival brand needs to consider responding to another
brand’s crisis to avoid an unintended spillover crisis.
Crisis Response Strategies in Crisis Communication Theories
Communication plays a vital role in crisis management (Sturges, 1994). Over the past
three decades, previous scholars have developed crisis communication theories and a handful of
crisis response strategies to help brands protect their reputations and brand equity from a crisis
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(Coombs, 2007; Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Heslop et al., 2013; Huang, 2008). Early crisis
communication theories proposed response strategies mainly based on descriptive summaries of
practical experience and case studies. With the introduction of attribution theory to crisis
communication, Coombs and Holladay (1996) established a theoretical link between the type of
crisis and crisis communication strategies. Crisis communication has emerged in an era where
the core construct is crisis responsibility attribution. However, spillover crises “represent a
paradox in which an organization finds itself facing reputational and legitimacy threats without
any responsibility for causing the crisis” (Veil & Dillingham, 2020, p. 364). Theories rooted in
the theoretical alignment of crisis response strategies with crisis responsibility attribution do not
apply to spillover crisis. Veil et al. (2016, p. 319) pointed out that “the current literature on crisis
response strategies does not account for this distinct exigency.” There is an urgent need to
expand crisis communication theories to understand how to respond to spillover crises.
The essential purposes of a crisis response remain the same: coping with the key publics’
stress and informing the publics of the brand’s solutions and remedies. Sturges (1994) proposed
three strategic foci of a crisis response message: instructing, adjusting, and internalizing. These
three foci reflect the fact that a crisis response is designed to help stakeholders cope with the
physical threat and psychological stress caused by the crisis and, on this basis, mitigate damage
to the brand’s reputation. Coombs (2007) stressed that every crisis response should include
information for instructing and adjusting. Kim and Liu (2012) treated instructing and adjusting
information as the base crisis response, suggesting that addressing stakeholders’ needs is the
priority for a brand before repairing the brand’s reputation (Coombs, 2007). In addition to the
basic information in a crisis response, technically, crisis responses should be quick, accurate, and
consistent. Before discussing potential strategies for responding to spillover crises, the following
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provides a review of the existing crisis response strategies in several mainstream crisis
communication theories. Mainstream crisis communication theories include corporate apologia
theory (Hearit, 1997; Hearit, 2006; Ware & Linkugel, 1973), image restoration theory (Benoit,
1997), and situational crisis communication theory (Coombs, 2007; Coombs & Holladay, 1996).
Corporate Apologia Theory. Deeply rooted in rhetorical theories, corporate apologia
theory aims to present “a compelling, counter description…to situate alleged wrongdoing in a
more favorable context” (Hearit, 1994, p. 115). More specifically, by using corporate apologia
strategies, a brand can present a competing narrative that strategically redefines the problem and
reframes the crisis in a way that is more favorable to the brand. The brand also aims to reduce the
publics’ negative emotions, such as anger and anxiety, and show regret for the crisis and
empathy for the victims. Last, apologetic messages should help the brand dissociate itself from
the source of negativity (Hearit, 1994). In essence, it is a defensive method.
Ware and Linkugel (1973) proposed four argumentative strategies that can help defend a
brand from being accused of being involved in wrongdoing: denial, bolstering, differentiation,
and transcendence. In the context of corporate apologia, denial means that a brand simply denies
“any participation in, relationship to, or positive sentiment toward whatever it is that repels the
audience” (Ware & Linkugel, 1973, p. 276). Bolstering means reminding people of the brand’s
past good performance. Differentiation refers to redefining the crisis so it seems less negative
and extricating the brand from the crisis (Coombs, 2010). Hearit (1997, p. 217) defined
transcendence as a strategy to “redefine ‘sin’ into a ‘virtue’” by placing the brand’s acts in a
larger context that especially features a moral aspect. Ware and Linkugel (1973) grouped these
four strategies into reformative (i.e., denial and bolstering) and transformative (i.e.,
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differentiation and transcendence) strategies. The difference is that transformative strategies
attempt to establish new meaning for the brand’s acts (Ihlen, 2002).
Dissociation is another apologetic approach that Hearit took from rhetorical theory.
Hearit (1996, p. 235) defined it as “a technique whereby apologists bifurcate a unitary concept.”
Ihlen (2002) further elaborated on the dissociation strategy, arguing that it is not to simply cut
the connection between the two entities/ideas but to also rearrange the structure between them.
Hearit (1996) proposed three types of association: opinion/knowledge dissociation,
individual/group dissociation, and act/essence dissociation. Dissociation is prompted by a desire
to distance or remove the accused entity from the rest of the innocent.
Image Repair Theory (IRT). Image repair theory (Benoit, 2000) or image restoration
theory (Benoit, 1995; Benoit, 1997) was developed based on the symbolic approaches of
apologia (Coombs, 2010; Hearit, 1996). Benoit (1997) suggested that a brand needs to issue a
crisis response because an attack threatens the brand’s reputation and image. The attack arises
for two reasons: (1) a brand is responsible for a certain act, or (2) the act is perceived as
offensive to the public. Notably, Benoit (1997) stressed that people’s perceptions of a crisis is
arguably more important than the reality of the crisis. Thus, the purpose of a crisis response
strategy is to either reduce the offensiveness of the crisis or change the publics’ perceptions of
the brand’s responsibility.
Image repair theory offers a comprehensive list of crisis response strategies grouped into
five categories: denial (i.e., simple denial, shift the blame); evasion of responsibility (i.e.,
provocation, defeasibility, accident, good intentions); reducing the offensiveness of the event
(i.e., bolstering, minimization, differentiation, transcendence, attack accuser, compensation);
corrective action; and mortification. It is worth noting that in contrast to the corporate apology
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strategy, the IRT strategy has strategies that take a primarily defensive stance as well as
strategies that make amends for faults and compensate the public, implying an acknowledgment
of misconduct. The criticism of IRT is that it is source-centric by nature (Benoit, 2000; Burns &
Bruner, 2000) and lacks a theoretical foundation for the response options.
Situational crisis communication theory (SCCT). Coombs and Holladay (1996)
introduced attribution theory (Weiner, 1985) to crisis communications and developed the
situational crisis communication theory, which provides a theoretical link between the type of
crisis and the crisis response strategy. Because SCCT addresses the drawbacks of the early crisis
communication theories that lack a solid theoretical foundation, it has become the dominant
theory in the field, and crisis responsibility has become the core construct of crisis responses. To
make sense of why a crisis occurs, people will make attribution decisions about who is
responsible for the crisis. Following attribution theory, the analysis of crisis responsibility
attribution depends on three dimensions: locus, controllability, and stability (Coombs &
Holladay, 1996). SCCT suggests that people’s crisis responsibility attribution has a significant
effect on people’s perceptions of the reputation of the brand in crisis and their affective and
behavioral responses to the brand (Coombs, 2010). Based on the level of crisis responsibility, a
crisis can be categorized into three clusters: victim, accidental, and preventable. Specifically, a
brand is perceived as having less responsibility for the crisis in the victim cluster, such as natural
disasters and rumors, leading to a mild reputational threat. The accidental cluster includes crises
caused by technical errors wherein a brand bears minimal responsibility. For crises in the
preventable cluster, a brand has “knowingly placed people at risk” (Coombs, 2007, p. 168),
bringing a severe reputational threat.
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Corresponding to the three types of crises, three groups of primary response strategies are
proposed: denial, diminish, and rebuild strategies. Diminish strategies aim to reduce the
perceived severity of a crisis and minimize crisis responsibility. Rebuild strategies aim to repair
and regain people’s positive perceptions about the brand through compensation and apologies. It
is worth noting, however, that these crisis response strategies are aligned with the crisis types on
a defensive-accommodative continuum. When a brand is perceived as bearing little or no
responsibility for a crisis, the brand can choose defensive strategies (e.g., denial, excuse) to
protect itself. In contrast, when a brand is perceived as responsible for the crisis, the brand needs
to use more accommodative strategies (e.g., corrective action, apology). Supplementing these
primary strategies is a secondary strategy like bolstering (Coombs, 2007). SCCT also suggests
that different crisis response strategies should be employed based on different situational factors.
Three factors in a crisis situation include the initial crisis responsibility, a brand’s crisis history,
and prior relational reputation (Coombs, 2007). By employing strategies aligned with the crisis
type, an organization can expect to shape the causal attributions of the crisis, alter negative
perceptions, and reduce the negative effects caused by the crisis (Coombs, 1995).
Spillover Crises Response Strategies
Although there is a wealth of research on crisis response strategies, not all studies are
applicable to rival brands. The crisis response strategies proposed by the mainstream theories
discussed above aim to shape people’s perceptions of the brand’s crisis responsibility. Brands
can adopt either defensive strategies to refuse to accept responsibility for the crisis or adopt
accommodative strategies to gain the public’s understanding and forgiveness. However, even
though the rival brand is not responsible for another brand’s crises, yet it suffers a spillover crisis
due to its association with the culpable brand. Therefore, to change the perceived crisis
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responsibility, the innocent rival brand should weaken the perceived association between itself
and the culpable brand. Yu et al. (2008, p. 463) suggested that brands should engage in “a
preferential detachment process” to minimize the risk of a spillover crisis. In other words, a rival
brand should adopt response strategies that can weaken the diagnosticity cues upon which people
make judgments about the rival brand based on people’s previous knowledge about the crisisstricken brand (Shin et al., 2016). By diminishing the association with or detaching from the
brand in crisis, rival brands can discourage people from engaging in categorical thinking and
decrease the likelihood of being negatively affected by the crisis. For example, in the case of
celebrity endorsements, brands could immediately terminate the collaboration (e.g., cut ties with
a transgressed celebrity) to prevent undesired reputational threats to the brand (Sato et al., 2019).
Based on the review of existing crisis response strategies, defensive strategies help distance and
dissociate the rival brand from the brand in crisis. There is no rationale for a rival brand to use
accommodative strategies to respond to the crisis, such as apologizing or promising corrective
action.
Previous research has also suggested several strategies for spillover crises. Borah and
Tellis (2016) examined negative chatter around the crisis-stricken brand and its rival brands after
a product recall crisis. They recommended that “firms should lie low and avoid comparisons
with firms that are undergoing a recall crisis” (p. 157). This suggestion seems reasonable. From
the perspective of associative network theory, keeping a low profile and avoiding comparisons
can be understood as avoiding media and public attention, thereby suppressing the association
between the brand in crisis and the rival brand in people’s minds. However, it is doubtful
whether the activation of such associations in people’s minds can be avoided in the current
media environment in which information spreads rampantly through social media. As Poroli and
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Huang’s (2018) study suggested, the communication and interactions among stakeholders play a
vital role in increasing the accessibility of the association. Furthermore, other scholars have
different opinions regarding this “flying low” or “no comments” approach. Norheim-Hansen and
Meschi (2020) asserted that people are highly likely to interpret a rival brand’s use of a wait-andsee strategy as silent support for the culpable brand if the two brands are from the same brand
alliance. This approach may also slow the rebound of a brand’s reputation and stock prices
compared to proactive crisis response strategies (Coombs, 2015).
Veil et al. (2016) proposed five spillover crisis response strategies based on how the
peanut butter brands Jif and Peter Pan responded to the Peanut Corporation of America’s crisis to
protect their brands. The strategies included disassociation, denial, ingratiation, reminding, and
compensation. Two points are worth noting about these five strategies. First, Veil and his
colleagues’ definition of denial strategy is slightly different from definitions by other scholars.
Veil et al. (2016, p. 327) defined the denial strategy as “deny any involvement in the crisis and
name (blame) the organization in crisis.” The definition includes the component of blaming the
brand that is responsible for the original crisis. Second, they included three accommodative
strategies. The ingratiation strategy refers to thanking stakeholders for their trust and loyalty. The
compensation strategy refers to regaining stakeholders’ focus on their own products by offering
special incentives and promotions. However, as previously discussed, there is no valid reason for
one brand to apologize or compensate for another brand’s crisis. In addition, adopting these
response strategies may lead to a boomerang effect, meaning that people could speculate about
whether the brand was actually involved in the crisis and, therefore, they compensated
consumers out of guilt. This approach would be counterproductive to achieving the goal of
cutting ties with the crisis-stricken brand by responding to the crisis.
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The current study argues that bolstering, differentiation, and denial are the three most
appropriate strategies for brands to respond to a spillover crisis. Rival brands can take advantage
of each of these strategies to dissociate themselves from the source of the problem (i.e., the
crisis-stricken brand). These strategies are defensive strategies so they can reduce or cut the
perceived association between the innocent brand and the crisis-stricken brand. Bolstering and
differentiation strategies are comparative in nature, but neither approach includes admission of
guilt. Denial is denying any connection to the cause of the crisis (Coombs, 2007).
Denial. Denial is a straightforward strategy to cut any connection with the crisis-stricken
brand. The strategy has been tested in marketing research and shown to be effective in helping a
rival brand distance itself from the crisis-stricken brand (e.g., Roehm & Tybout, 2006; Yu et al.,
2008). Roehm and Tybout (2006) examined the effect of a rival brand issuing a denial on
reducing negative spillover effects. They found that by issuing a denial, the rival brand could
prevent consumers from thinking it was involved in the same negative activity when the rival
brand suffered from negative spillover effects. However, if the rival brand is not affected by a
spillover crisis, issuing a denial would induce a boomerang effect and thus hurt instead of protect
brand evaluations. Lee and Rim (2017) also confirmed the effectiveness of a denial strategy in
their study of spillover crises in a company-nonprofit partnership. They found that issuing a
denial was most effective in generating favorable brand attitudes compared to having no
response and simply announcing the dissolution of the partnership. Conversely, Borah and Tellis
(2016) disputed the effectiveness of the denial strategy in mitigating negative spillover effects.
They argued that issuing a denial could backfire for the rival brand because a denial may act as a
prime, reminding people of the association between the two brands. Their argument explained

35

why there could be a boomerang effect since the premise for the denial strategy (i.e., to
effectively mitigating negative spillover effects) is that a spillover crisis actually occurred.
Bolstering Strategy. The bolstering strategy reminds consumers of the brand’s
advantages, good traits, and clean crisis history to compensate for the negative impression left by
the crisis (Benoit, 1997). To employ a bolstering strategy, a crisis communication message is
presented as a supportive defense message that mentions only the positive aspects of the brand,
such as its clean corporate history and social actions, to instill a positive image of the company
and distance itself from the crisis brand (Benoit, 1997; Wan & Pfau, 2004). Although SCCT
suggests that the bolstering strategy (Coombs, 2007) is supplementary to other response
strategies, other scholars (Brown & White, 2010) have found that it can be used alone to
effectively shape people’s crisis responsibility attribution, thereby mitigating the crisis. When
used by a rival brand, a bolstering strategy is comparative, implying that there are differences
between the rival brand and the crisis-stricken brand without naming the crisis-stricken brand.
On the face of it, a bolstering strategy does not include explicit comparisons. However, the
current study argues that implicit comparisons are achieved by the contextual effects of the
crisis. During the crisis, the crisis and the association between the crisis-stricken brand and the
rival brand are salient in people’s minds and are regarded as contextual referents when assessing
the rival brand’s response message. Therefore, a bolstering strategy demonstrates an implicit
superiority over the crisis-stricken brand to help the rival brand distance itself from the crisis and
offset people’s negative impressions. For example, Veil et al. (2016) studied the Peanut Corp. of
America’s crisis due to salmonella-contaminated peanuts, which led to a recall of 3900 peanut
products across 200 US companies. They found, to mitigate the negative effects of a spillover
crisis, Peter Pan, a peanut butter brand, used the bolstering strategy to reinforce its stringent
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safety protocols for production while issuing a series of denials. In another study on a public
diplomacy crisis, the researchers examined the image repair strategies used by the Saudi Arabia
Embassy to restore its national image (Zhang & Benoit, 2004). Through textual analysis of the
Saudi Arabia government’s paid advertising and news coverage in the U.S. media after the 9/11
terrorist attacks, Zhang and Benoit (2004) found that bolstering was the predominant image
repair strategy used by the Saudi government and to somewhat dispel the accusation that Saudi
Arabia supported terrorism.
Differentiation. When used by a rival brand, the differentiation strategy aims to make a
direct and sharp comparison by explicitly mentioning the brand in crisis and the rival brand and
lists the two brands’ advantages and disadvantages. With a differentiation strategy, a rival brand
first attempts to address the weak attributes of the crisis-stricken brand, followed by stressing its
own positive corporate history and social activity. This strategy can highlight the distinction
between the crisis-stricken brand and the rival brand to dissociate the two brands. Through direct
and concrete comparisons, it suggests that the rival brand cannot be implicated in similar actions.
Roehm and Tybout (2006, p. 371) reasoned that “when attention is focused on differentiation
among brands, a scandal is likely to be perceived as unique to the scandalized brand and its
effect is likely to be isolated.” The following hypotheses are proposed to compare the efficacy of
the three crisis response strategies with no response.
H4: Participants in the denial message condition will have (H4a) more favorable brand attitudes
and (H4b) higher purchase intention than those in the no-response condition.
H5: Participants in the bolstering message condition will have (H5a) more favorable brand
attitudes and (H5b) higher purchase intention than those in the no-response condition.
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H6: Participants in the differentiation message condition will have (H6a) more favorable brand
attitudes and (H6b) higher purchase intention than those in the no-response condition.
Attribute Similarity and Crisis Response Strategies
Not only does attribute similarity determine whether a spillover crisis occurs but it also
influences the efficacy of the crisis response strategies in mitigating the negative effects of
spillover crises. The classic definition of similarity is “total feature overlap” (Broniarczyk &
Alba, 1994, p. 215), which describes an overall global similarity between products or services.
However, the overall similarity is sometimes inadequate to help people make judgments about
the brands. Some scholars have argued (Broniarczyk & Alba, 1994) that customers buy a product
or service to pursue specific utilitarian or hedonic features of the product or service. Tversky
(1977, p. 327) suggested that products or services can be regarded as “collections of features,”
and the perceived similarity between two products or services is a function of “their common and
distinctive features.” The common attributes determine how similar the two products or services
are. In contrast to global similarity, attribute similarity provides a clearer explanation of why
Brand A is diagnostic to Brand B. Diagnosticity is defined by Tversky (Tversky, 1977, p. 342) as
“the categorical significance of features,” which is the key factor leading to spillover crises. As
discussed above, negative spillover effects depend on the accessibility and the diagnosticity of
the association between the crisis-stricken and rival brands (Broniarczyk & Alba, 1994;
Janakiraman et al., 2009; Roehm & Tybout, 2006). Thus, when choosing a crisis response
strategy, rival brands should consider their “accessibility and diagnosticity” resulting from the
product/service attribute similarities with the crisis-stricken brand.
The current study argues that the perceived attribute similarity between the crisis-stricken
brand and the rival brand can be regarded as contextual cues for consumers to judge the rival

38

brand’s crisis response message. According to Tourangeau and Rasinski (1988), contextual cues
can provide a frame of reference for people making judgments or determine what information is
valuable for people. Stated differently, people’s perceptions of the attribute similarity among
brands may influence their interpretations of the rival brands’ crisis response message and thus
its efficacy in mitigating spillover effects. The effects of contexts on subsequent judgments
(Herr, 1989) include assimilation and contrast effects. Assimilation effects occur when the
judgments of an object “move toward the contextual anchoring point,” whereas contrast effects
occur when the judgments are “moving away from the point of reference” (Levin, 2002, p. 146).
Levin (2002) stated that assimilation effects lead to the integration of the newly acquired
information with the contextual information, whereas contrast effects lead to a comparison
between the new information and the contextual cues. Assimilation and contrast effects in brand
evaluations have been studied for decades (Herr, 1989; Levin & Levin, 2000; Meyers-Levy &
Sternthal, 1993). According to the theory, feature overlap among brands determines whether the
assimilation or contrast effects occur in consumers’ brand evaluations (Meyers-Levy &
Sternthal, 1993).
In terms of the impact of a response strategy on spillover crises, the perceived attribute
similarity between the crisis-stricken and rival brands serves as the contextual anchor point.
When the attribute similarity of the rival brand is high (i.e., accessibility and diagnosticity are
high), crisis response strategies are better to generate contrast effects to mitigate negative
spillover effects. For high-similarity rival brands, the crisis response strategy should change
people’s perceptions about the similarity between the two brands (i.e., reduce the diagnosticity of
the crisis-stricken brand to the rival brand). The contrast effect can be achieved by explicitly
illustrating the sharp differences between the crisis-stricken and rival brands at the attribute level.
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When the attribute similarity of the rival brand is low (i.e., accessibility and diagnosticity are
low), the crisis response strategy does not need to induce contrast effects. In other words, the
crisis response message should induce the assimilation effect with the contextual reference to
reinforce the fact that the two brands share low attribute similarities. In addition, since lowsimilarity rival brands are relatively less accessible in people’s minds, the crisis response strategy
should avoid increasing the accessibility of the association between the two brands.
Considering the two crisis response strategies, the differentiation strategy demonstrates
an explicit comparison while the bolstering strategy implies an implicit comparison.
Raghunathan and Irwin (2001) suggested that the contrast effects occur primarily through a
process of comparison of the target with the context. Therefore, the differentiation strategy
should be more suitable for a high-similarity rival brand as it needs to induce contrast effects.
Conversely, the bolstering strategy is more suitable for a low-similarity rival brand. It is expected
to induce assimilation effects emphasizing that the two brands are less similar. Without
mentioning the crisis-stricken brand name in the crisis response message, the bolstering strategy
will not greatly increase the accessibility of the rival brand. Based on this discussion, H7 and H8
are proposed.
H7: A rival brand with high attribute similarity to the brand in crisis will induce (H7a) more
positive brand attitudes and (H7b) purchase intention when using a differentiation strategy than a
bolstering strategy.
H8: A rival brand with low attribute similarity to the brand in crisis will induce (H8a) more
positive brand attitudes and (H8b) purchase intention when using a bolstering strategy than a
differentiation strategy.
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Mediating the Effects of Crisis Response Strategies
According to SCCT (Coombs, 2007), crisis response strategies influence people’s
perceptions and behavioral intention toward the brand. By using denial, bolstering, or
differentiation strategies, rival brands aim to mitigate the negative impact of spillover crises on
its brand evaluations. Previous studies have further investigated the potential mediators that
connect the relationship between different crisis response strategies and reputational
consequences (Claeys et al., 2010; Huang, 2008; Kim & Niederdeppe, 2013). Crisis response
strategies protect brand evaluations by either reducing negative factors or enhancing positive
factors regarding the brand. The current study argues that blame attribution and attitudes towards
the crisis response message mediate the effects of these crisis response strategies on brand
attitudes and purchase intention. Figure 3 presents the mediation model of spillover crisis
mitigation for this study.
Figure 3
The Conceptual Model of Spillover Crisis Mitigation

Blame Attribution
Blame attribution has been a central concept in crisis communication theories (Coombs,
2007; Coombs & Holladay, 1996). SCCT (Coombs, 2007) identifies multiple factors that
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influence people’s attribution of who is responsible for the crisis. By shaping people’s crisis
responsibility attribution, crisis response strategies can reduce the adverse effects of a crisis on a
brand’s reputation. The theoretical root of SCCT is attribution theory (Weiner, 1985). According
to the theory, people make sense of an event by analyzing the causes, which, in turn, influences
their motivation for subsequent behaviors. Attribution theory assumes that people are rational,
and their judgment and behaviors are guided by reasoning. Unexpected and negative events are
more likely to trigger causality attribution (Weiner, 2014).
Weiner (1985) summarized three underlying dimensions on which people analyze the
causality of negative events—causal locus, causal stability, and causal control. Locus refers to
the location of the cause—internal or external. Stability refers to if the cause of the crisis is
unchanging or temporary. If the cause is stable, there is a high likelihood of a similar crisis
occurring in the future. Controllability refers to whether the cause of the crisis can be controlled
by the brand. For example, a natural disaster is out of a brand’s control, whereas a human error
can be controlled by the brand by taking certain measures (Weiner, 2014).
In an ambiguous brand crisis, an individual’s blame attribution is an attempt to interpret
what has happened, what actions should be taken to minimize the immediate risks and harm, and
whether they should continue to favor and use the brand’s products or services. In Folkes (1984)
seminal study, the author introduced attribution theory to understand consumer behavior after
experiencing a product failure. By conducting an experiment in which each condition varied by
the three cause dimensions, Folkes found that consumers’ affective and behavioral reactions to a
product failure were predicted by their perceived reasons for the failure. The attribution along the
cause stability dimension influenced people’s expectancies of future product failure, which
could, in turn, cause them to request a refund. Furthermore, the attribution along stable and

42

controllability dimensions together induced anger and even retaliation against the brand. Weiner
(2000) also claimed that individuals’ attributional process of the cause stability was related to
their product satisfaction, and that of the cause controllability impacted their judgments of
responsibility and retributive behavior. In SCCT (Coombs, 2007), stakeholders’ attribution of
crisis responsibility impacts their perceptions of the brand’s reputation and subsequent
behavioral intentions. Blame attribution has also been found to negatively influence people’s
purchase intention, brand attitude, brand trust, and brand satisfaction (Coombs & Holladay,
1996, 2001; Hegner et al., 2016; Ki & Brown, 2013; Klein & Dawar, 2004).
The primary purpose of a brand’s response to a crisis is to shape the public’s attribution
of crisis responsibility (Coombs, 2007). By influencing people’s perceptions of the responsibility
attributed to it, a brand can effectively mitigate the offensiveness of a crisis and protect its brand
evaluations. This is also true for brands in spillover crises. One might question why people
would attribute blame to brands that apparently had nothing to do with the crisis. The answer is
that the attribution for the crisis-stricken brand is different from the attribution for its rival
brands. An individual’s attribution for the brand in crisis is to make causal inferences about the
crisis in an attempt to explain why the crisis happened to that brand. In contrast, the attribution
for a rival brand is to infer whether rival brands are facing similar problems in the present and
the likelihood of being entangled in similar crises in the future as the crisis-stricken brand.
The attribution for a rival brand starts with the prior crisis outcomes of the brand in crisis.
Due to the similarity of product/service attributes of brands within the same industry, the
problem that leads to a brand’s CA crisis is likely to be perceived as an industry-wide problem.
As Laufer and Wang (2018) pointed out, if the cause of a CA crisis is related to common
industry practices and standards, one would assume that the crisis is diagnostic for other brands
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in the same industry. For example, when a fast-food brand faces a food hygiene crisis because
they are reusing cooking oil, other fast-food brands may also be questioned on this issue. Thus,
to increase perceptual clarity in this ambiguous and uncertain situation, people will engage in an
attribution search for rival brands who could have similar incidences like the initial crisis. In
other words, they may assess whether the factors that caused the crisis are also present in the
rival brands (cause locus), how likely it is that rival brands could experience a similar crisis in
the future (cause stability), and whether rival brands can prevent similar crises from happening
(cause controllability). The attributional thinking leads to an expectation of rival brands, which
then determines people’s next actions.
Crisis response messages can shape people’s attributional conclusions about a crisis
(Brown & White, 2010; Coombs, 2006; Coombs, 2007; Coombs & Holladay, 2008; Kim &
Sung, 2014). In complex crisis situations, consumers may “turn to firms to facilitate causal
attribution” (Folkes, 1984, p. 407). The information provided by the brand in crisis has the
potential to shape people’s perceptions of the cause locus, stability, and controllability. Folkes
(1984) stated that a salesperson’s explanation about a product failure could change consumers’
attribution of causal stability, thereby influencing their behavioral intention of requesting a
refund. In addition, apologies from the brand could lessen blame and increase consumers’
favorable brand attitudes. Kim and Sung (2014) found that providing stakeholders with
instructing information and adjusting information about the crisis effectively lowered their
attribution of crisis responsibility. They also found that a two-sided crisis response message with
both positive and negative arguments about the brand more effectively helped stakeholders reach
a lower blame attribution for a victim crisis than a one-sided message. Likewise, Brown and
White (2010) showed that the use of a bolstering strategy led to less crisis responsibility

44

attribution since the strategy potentially built a positive connection between the brand and the
public.
Previous scholars have treated blame attribution as a critical factor in explaining spillover
effects (Carrillat et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2021; Lim & Shim, 2019). Carrillat et al. (2014)
suggested that the level of blameworthiness of a celebrity endorser who was involved in a
negative event contributed to consumers’ negative attitudes toward the endorsed brand and even
the competing brand. In a study about a brand safety violation, Lee et al. (2021) found that
consumers’ negative feelings toward offensive content related to animal cruelty and misogyny
spilled over to a brand whose ads were placed next to the offensive content. Blame attribution for
the advertiser played a mediating role in the relationship between the perceived association
between the ad and offensive content and negative word of mouth towards the advertised brand.
Likewise, Lim and Shim (2019) found that blame attribution mediated the effects of
individualizing the moral foundation of consumers’ boycott intention in negative spillover
effects from overseas supplier factories to the U.S company. Therefore, the following hypotheses
are proposed.
H9: When the attribute similarity is high, the differentiation strategy will have a greater positive
impact on (H9a) brand attitude and (H9b) purchase intention through lower blame attribution
than the bolstering strategy.
H10: When the attribute similarity is low, the bolstering strategy will have a greater positive
impact on (H10a) brand attitude and (H10b) purchase intention through lower blame attribution
than the differentiation strategy.
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Attitude toward the Crisis Response Message
People’s attitudes toward a message refers to their overall evaluation of a message. The
field of advertising has conducted a wealth of studies over decades focusing on the mediating
role of one’s attitude toward an ad in the advertising effectiveness (Mackenzie et al., 1986;
Shimp, 1981). In their seminal study, Mitchell and Olson (1981) switched the attention from
product attribute beliefs to attitudes toward the ads in the formation of brand attitudes. According
to Mackenzie et al.’s (1986) dual mediating model, the attitude toward the message plays a
significant role in generating more favorable brand attitudes and subsequently increases purchase
intention. The underlying mechanism is that people who see an advertisement will construct
cognitive and affective evaluations (i.e., attitudes) toward the ads. These favorable attitudes
toward the ads are positively associated with the subsequent evaluations of the brand and
purchase intention. The mediating role of attitudes toward the message has been examined in
various situations, including comparative positioning (e.g., Dröge & Darmon, 1987; Muehling,
1987) and health advocacy campaigns (e.g., Cho & Choi, 2010). However, very few studies in
crisis communication have addressed the qualities of a crisis communication message to
effectively manage a crisis. Lim (2019) identified four qualities that can be used as evaluative
metrics for effective crisis response messages: promptness, assertiveness, reliability, and
transparency. These evaluative criteria measure consumers’ judgment about how well the crisis
response functions to protect the organizational reputation in terms of trust. Zhang and Lim
(2021) examined the mediating role of attitudes toward a crisis response message and examined
the efficacy of crisis response strategies in reducing negative spillover effects contingent on the
brand’s market position. Their study provides empirical support for the indirect effect of crisis
response strategies on brand attitudes and purchase intention through attitudes towards the
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response message. As the advertising literature suggests (Mackenzie et al., 1986), cognitive and
affective evaluations about a message are important for communicators to assess whether the
message is well-received and well-processed by consumers. Subsequently, the literature
determines the effect of each message strategy on people’s attitudes and purchase intention
related to a brand. The current research argues that rival brands should strategically induce more
positive message evaluations to achieve their reputational and business-related objectives. Thus,
the following hypotheses are proposed.
H11: When attribute similarity is high, the differentiation strategy will have a greater positive
impact on (H11a) brand attitudes and (H11b) purchase intention through higher attitudes toward
the message than the bolstering strategy.
H12: When attribute similarity is low, the bolstering strategy will have a greater positive impact
on (H12a) brand attitudes and (H12b) purchase intention through higher attitudes toward the
message than the differentiation strategy.
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Chapter 3: Methods
The current research includes two experimental studies examining the negative spillover
effects among brands within the same industry and the efficacy of crisis response strategies in
mitigating negative spillover effects for brands with different levels of similarity to the crisisstricken brand. This section provides details about participant recruitment, sample size
determination, and the use of fictitious names in the two studies.
Participant Recruitment
Participants for all experiments were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
MTurk is a crowdsourcing marketplace that allows companies and individuals (Requesters) to
recruit participants (Workers) to perform various small human intelligence tasks (HITs), ranging
from annotating photos to taking surveys. The Requesters need to create a HIT on MTurk and
prepay for Worker rewards and platform administration. Requesters can set the qualifications for
the initial screening of workers, such as the number of HITs previously approved and the total
approval rating. When a HIT is posted, registered Workers on MTurk who meet the
qualifications can see the HIT and decide whether to accept it based on the task description, time
spent, and the amount of the reward. After a task is completed by a Worker and approved by the
Requester, a monetary incentive will be transferred from the Requester’s prepaid HIT balance to
the Worker’s account.
MTurk has become a viable avenue for social science researchers to collect survey data
and even conduct interactive experiments that require relatively complicated instructions and
more attentive participants (Chandler & Shapiro, 2016; Thomas & Clifford, 2017). Concerns
about the data quality of MTurk results have been raised since researchers lack control over the
data collection procedure. However, previous studies have provided a wealth of evidence that the
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data quality of MTurk results is similar and even superior to that of other traditional methods
(Berinsky et al., 2012; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012). For example, Hauser and
Schwarz (2016) compared the attentiveness of MTurk Workers compared to college students on
the instructional manipulation checks in three experiments. They found that MTurk Workers
were consistently more attentive than college students across all three experiments. After
reviewing the research on the data validity of MTurk, Thomas and Clifford (2017) concluded
that the internal validity of the interactive experiments using MTurk Workers was comparable to
that of experiments conducted in laboratory environments.
Previous studies (Hunt & Scheetz, 2018; Thomas & Clifford, 2017) have found that
screening questions can effectively identify and disqualify participants with poor performance
and thus significantly reduced failed manipulation checks. Peer et al. (2014) found that highreputation MTurk workers (above 95% approval rating) provided higher quality data than did
low-reputation workers. Therefore, following the suggestions of previous studies, the current
research recruited MTurk workers who had been previously approved for more than 500 HITs
and had a total HIT approval rating of 95% or higher.
Sample Size
Several methods have been suggested to determine the appropriate sample size. A
traditional view is that the sample size should be several times as large as the number of
variables of interest in the study. For example, Schreiber et al. (2006) stated that the consensus
on sample size is 10 participants per variable. However, some experimental methodologies have
suggested that the rule of thumb for experiment studies is at least 30 participants per group. In
addition, power analysis is a rigorous method to calculate the necessary number of participants
needed to detect the effect of a given size (Cohen, 1992).

49

The current study followed the rule of thumb of at least 30 participants per group for the
experimental study. A priori power analysis was also conducted using the GPower program (Faul
& Erdfelder, 2004). The power (1 - β) was set at 0.80, and the significant criterion (α) was .05.
The results indicated that a sample of 64 participants would be needed in each group to detect a
medium effect (d = .50) using a t-test. The results also indicated that a sample of 68 participants
would be needed to detect a medium effect (f2 = .15) with two predictors using an F-test.
Fictitious Brand Names
For the experimental stimuli, fictitious brand names were used to enhance the internal
validity of the experiment (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). By using fictitious brand names,
unintended confounding effects were avoided including participants’ prior attitudes, experiences,
and relationships with the real brands. In addition, the use of fictitious brand names can prevent
ethical or legal issues. At the end of the experiment, participants were told that the brand names,
crisis news, and crisis responses were fictitious. To reduce the artificiality of the experiments, all
experimental stimuli were created based on real-world cases and information but were somewhat
exaggerated to achieve successful manipulation.
The detailed methods and procedures for each study are described in Chapter 4 (Study 1)
and Chapter 5 (Study 2), respectively.
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Chapter 4: Study 1
Methods
Overview
Study 1 used a 2 (Attribute similarity: high vs. low) by 4 (Crisis response strategy:
bolstering, differentiation, denial, vs. no response) between-subjects factorial design. The brand
crisis scenario was a fictitious service failure of a home-sharing rental company (TripShare) in
which the host of a rental property was sued for recording guests using hidden cameras. It was
assumed that TripShare’s competing brands with high-attribute similarity (PeerStay, another
home-sharing rental) and low-attribute similarity (Bliss Plaza, a hotel) would experience a
spillover crisis. Study 1 tested the efficacy of different types of responses from the rival brand to
the crisis to reduce a negative spillover effect. The crisis scenario for Study 1 was adapted from a
real-world Airbnb incident in California where a couple sued Airbnb for invasion of privacy after
hidden cameras were found in their rental unit and video was allegedly posted on the Internet
(Fussell, 2019). Given that hidden spy cameras have been an enduring problem for the lodging
industry, this is a realistic scenario for a crisis event and spillover effect.
Stimuli
Three stimuli were created for Study 1: (1) an online article on Tripadvisor that indicated
the attribute similarities and differences between home-sharing rentals and hotels, (2) a New
York Times article that reported an incident of hidden cameras found in a home-sharing rental,
and (3) a rival brand’s crisis response message (See Appendix B). The article on Tripadvisor
described service attributes of home-sharing rentals and hotels, including a side-by-side
comparison of cost, location, amenities, human interaction, security, and environment. The three
fictitious brand names (i.e., TripShare, PeerStay, and Bliss Plaza) and the subcategories (i.e.,
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home-sharing rental and hotel) were highlighted. The news about the crisis in the New York
Times, titled Couples Finds Hidden Cameras in Bathroom, Bedroom in Their Trip Share Rental
Home: Home-Sharing Rentals Companies Face Privacy Crisis Again, reported a hidden camera
incident at a rental home offered through TripShare. The news coverage mentioned that the
incident rekindled the debate around security and privacy in the lodging industry. The crisis
response message was published on the rival brand’s Facebook page.
For Study 1, six versions of crisis response messages were created, varying the rival
brand’s name and crisis response strategies (PeerStay-Bolstering, PeerStay-Differentiation,
PeerStay-Denial, Bliss Plaza-Bolstering, Bliss Plaza-Differentiation, Bliss Plaza-Denial). In the
bolstering message, the rival brand primarily focused on highlighting their excellence and clean
history. Specifically, the brand highlighted its strict protocols and regulations for customer
security and privacy. The rival brand proudly claimed that no hidden cameras had been found in
its hundreds of listings/properties over the past decade. In addition, the brand provided details on
how its industry-leading measures of background screenings, room inspections, employee
training, and use of technologies were effective in ensuring the security and privacy of its
customers. Notably, the name of the crisis-stricken brand was never mentioned in the bolstering
message. In contrast, in the differentiation message, the rival brand named the crisis-stricken
brand: TripShare. The rival brand explicitly emphasized the differences between the crisisstricken brand and its own brand, and confidently stated that a similar incident would never
happen in their company/brand. The response used bullet points starting with “What TripShare
does” and “How we do things differently” to provide detailed comparisons between TripShare
and their own brand (i.e., the rival brand) in terms of background screenings, room inspections,
employee training, and use of technologies to demonstrate its ability to protect the security and
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privacy of its customers. The denial message was a brief note in which the rival brand pointed
out that their own brand had never experienced a hidden camera incident like the one at
TripShare. They also expressed strong confidence that similar incidents would never occur in the
future due to the brand’s deep commitment to protecting consumers’ security and privacy.
Procedure
A total of 640 participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and
randomly assigned to one of the ten groups using Qualtrics software (See Table 3). The
experiment included two parts. The first part was designed to test the brand spillover crisis. In
the first part of the experiment, all 640 participants were exposed to the same online article
describing the service attributes of home-sharing rentals and hotels. After reading the article,
participants in the high-similarity group reported their perceptions of attribute similarities
between TripShare (home-sharing rental) and PeerStay (another home-sharing rental). In
contrast, participants in the low-similarity group reported their perceptions of attribute
similarities between TripShare (home-sharing rental) and Bliss Plaza (a hotel). Then, participants
in the experimental groups (Group 1 to 8) read the news about the crisis, while those in the
control groups (Group 9 and 10) did not. After reading the news article, participants regardless of
their crisis news treatment condition (i.e., the crisis news group versus no crisis news group)
answered questions related to their perceptions of the crisis and negative emotions towards both
the brand in crisis and the rival brands in either high- or low-similarity level. Prior to the second
part of the experiment, participants performed a filler task in which they chose one of the two
places with stunning natural scenery. The purpose of the filler task was to give participants a
cognitive separation from the stimuli to reduce response bias (Podsakoff et al., 2012).
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The second part tested the efficacy of the rival brand’s response strategies. Only
participants exposed to the crisis news in the first part of the experiment (Group 1 to 8) were
involved in the second part of the experiment (N = 320). Group 1 to 3 and Group 5 to 8 served as
the experimental groups, whereas Group 4 and Group 8 served as the control groups. Participants
in the experimental groups were then shown one of three response messages from the rival
brand, while those in the control groups were shown no response messages. Participants then
answered questions about their perceptions of the rival brand including blame attribution,
attitudes toward the message, brand attitudes, and purchase intention. Lastly, demographic
information was collected. At the end of the experiment, participants read debriefing information
(See Appendix D) including the aim of the study and the use of the fictitious brand names that
were based on a real-world incident. Table 3 presents the experiment procedure for the
participants in each of the ten groups.
Table 3
Study 1: The experiment procedure and number of participants in each group
Group

# of
participant

Procedure
Part 1

Part 2

1

N=40

Attribute similarity article – Crisis news – Bolstering

2

N=40

Attribute similarity article – Crisis news – Differentiation

3

N=40

Attribute similarity article – Crisis news – Denial

4

N=40

Attribute similarity article – Crisis news – No response (Control)

5

N=40

Attribute similarity article – Crisis news – Bolstering

6

N=40

Attribute similarity article – Crisis news – Differentiation

7

N=40

Attribute similarity article – Crisis news – Denial

8

N=40

Attribute similarity article – Crisis news – No response (Control)

9

N=160

Attribute similarity article – No crisis news (Control)

10

N=160

Attribute similarity article – No crisis news (Control)
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Measures
Perceived crisis. Perceived crisis is defined as people’s perceptions of the severity of an
organization’s crisis (Lim, 2017). Participants were asked about their level of agreement with
four items about crisis severity on a 7-point Likert scale. The four items were adopted from
Lim’s study (2017). Sample statements include, “This situation would be difficult to deal with”
and “This situation would last a long time if immediate action were not taken.” The detailed
measures can be found in Appendix A. Participants rated the perceived crisis for both the crisisstricken brand and the rival brand. Cronbach’s alpha of the measurement was .86 (M = 5.27, SD
= 1.16) for the brand in crisis and .92 (M = 4.61, SD = 1.43) for the rival brand.
Negative emotion. Participants rated their level of emotions about both the brand in
crisis and the rival brand based on a 7-point scale (1: none; 4: a moderate amount; 7: a great
deal). Nine emotions were adopted from Jin et al. (2014), including unpleasant, downhearted,
unhappy, scared, fearful, afraid, nervous, anxious, and worried. The internal reliability (α) of the
measurement was .97 for the crisis-stricken brand (M = 4.01, SD = 1.65) and .98 for that of the
rival brand (M = 3.35, SD = 1.71).
Blame attribution. Blame attribution was measured on three dimensions: locus, stability,
and controllability. Participants were asked to report their agreement on statements related to
cause locus (4 items), stability (3 items) and controllability (3 items) for both the crisis-stricken
brand and rival brand on a 7-point Likert scale. The measures were adapted from Lee et al.
(2021). Sample items for cause locus, stability, and controllability are, “I think [rival brand]’s
security and privacy policies would cause the same incident,” “I think this incident can also
happen at [rival brand],” “I think [rival brand] could prevent this from happening in advance,”
respectively. The three items of controllability were reverse coded when creating the composite
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index of blame attribution. Cronbach’s alpha of the blame attribution was .77 (M = 3.70, SD
= .88).
Attitudes toward the crisis response message. A four-item semantic differential was
used to measure attitudes toward the crisis response message: negative/positive,” “not
likable/likable,” “unfavorable/favorable,” “unpleasant/pleasant,” and “bad/good.” The items
were adopted from Spears and Singh (2004). The mean of the items was 5.49, SD was 1.20, and
α was .95.
Brand Attitudes. Brand attitudes were measured on a five-item, seven-point, semantic
differential scale (Spears & Singh, 2004), including “negative/positive,” “not likable/likable,”
“unfavorable/favorable,” “unpleasant/pleasant,” and “bad/good.” Cronbach’s α for brand
attitudes was .95 (M = 5.37, SD = 1.20).
Purchase Intention. Participants were asked how likely/probably/possibly they would
use the rival brand’s service. The 7-point semantic differential scale was adapted from Spears
and Singh (2004). The internal reliability (α) was .94 (M = 5.02, SD = 1.45).
Manipulation check
As a manipulation check for attribute similarity, participants rated the overall inter-brand
similarity on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1= “strongly disagree;” 7 = “strongly agree”) and
attributes similarity on a 5-point scale (1= “not at all;” 5= “extremely similar”). Specifically,
participants rated how much the rival brand (PeerStay, Bliss Plaza) is similar to/share a lot in
common with/provides a service similar to the crisis-stricken brand (TripShare) (Ouyang et al.,
2020). They also rated how much they believed the rival brand was similar to the crisis-stricken
brand on the attributes of cost, location, amenities, human interaction, security, and environment.
Since the test of homogeneity of variance was significant, Welch’s t tests were used. The results
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indicated that the overall similarity of PeerStay with TripShare (M = 5.62, SD = 1.20) was
significantly higher than that of Bliss Plaza (M = 4.10, SD = 1.63) [t (587.95) = 13.49, p <.001].
In addition, the results showed that the attribute similarity of PeerStay with TripShare (M = 3.77,
SD = .93) was significantly higher than that of Bliss Plaza (M = 2.69, SD = 1.08) [t (623.25) =
13.56, p < .001). The manipulation of the levels of attribute similarity was successful.
Six items were created to check the manipulation of crisis response strategies. Among
them, four items were designed to reflect the characteristics of the differentiation strategy,
including “the statement compares their services to TripShare’s,” “its statement highlights the
differences from TripShare,” “the statement differentiates their services from TripShare’s,” and
“the statement highlights their competitive advantages over TripShare.” By using these items, the
study aimed to distinguish the differentiation strategy from the bolstering strategy. Participants
were asked to report their agreement on a 7-point Likert scale. Because Levene’s test of
homogeneity of variances is significant, Welch’s ANOVA was conducted. The results showed
that people in the bolstering strategy group (M = 4.48, SD = 1.66) had the lowest agreement on
these items, which was significantly different from people in the differentiation strategy group
(M = 5.87, SD = .98) and denial strategy group (M = 5.63, SD = .93) [Welch’s F (2,151.62) =
21.00, p < .001]. Furthermore, two items were used to distinguish the denial strategy from the
bolstering and differentiation strategies, including “the statement denies their involvement in a
similar crisis” and “the statement refuses to acknowledge that a similar incident could happen to
them.” These two items were designed to capture the characteristics of the denial strategy. The
results of Welch’s ANOVA indicated that people in the denial strategy group (M = 5.53, SD
= .95) had the highest agreement on these items compared to those in the differentiation strategy
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group (M = 4.88, SD = 1.35) and the bolstering strategy group (M = 4.81, SD = 1.58) [Welch’s F
(2,150.42) = 9.55, p < .001]. The manipulation of crisis response strategies was effective.
Results
Testing of H1 to H3 (Negative Spillover Hypotheses)
H1 and H2 were proposed to test the negative spillover hypotheses in a brand’s service
failure crisis. Table 5 shows the negative spillover effects of a brand’s service failure on the
perceptions and emotions toward the rival brands in the same business category. H1 predicted
that participants who read the news about the crisis would have (H1a) stronger perceptions of the
crisis and (H1b) more negative emotions toward the rival brand with high attribute similarity to
the crisis-stricken brand than participants did not read the news. To test H1, independent-sample
t-tests were conducted. As predicted, those who read the news about the crisis had a stronger
perception of the crisis (crisis news group: M = 4.96, SD = 1.35; control group: M = 4.65, SD =
1.23) [t (318) = 2.20, p = .029] and more negative emotions (crisis news group: M = 3.73, SD =
1.86; M = 3.35, SD = 1.46) [t (301.06) = 2.07, p =.039] toward the high-similarity rival brand
than those who did not read the news. Therefore, H1a and H1b are supported.
H2 predicted that participants who read the news about the crisis would have (H2a)
stronger perceptions of the crisis and (H2b) more negative emotions toward the rival brand with
low attribute similarity to the crisis-stricken brand than participants did not read the news about
the crisis. As a result of the independent sample t-test, no significant difference was found in the
two dependent variables between those who read the news about the crisis and those who did
not. Therefore, H2a and H2b are not supported.
H3 proposed that participants would have (H3a) a stronger perception of the crisis and
(H3b) more negative emotions toward a high-similarity rival brand than a low-similarity rival
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brand. The results of the interdependent sample t-tests for the crisis news groups showed that
those who were in the high-similarity group (M = 4.96, SD = 1.35) perceived a significantly
higher crisis than their counterparts in the low-similarity group (M = 4.38, SD = 1.70) [t (302.21)
= 3.43, p =.001]. Participants in the high-similarity group also exhibited more negative emotions
toward the rival brand (M = 3.73, SD = 1.86) than those in the low-similarity group (M = 3.08,
SD = 1.97) [t (316.90) = 3.04, p =.003]. Therefore, H3a and H3b are supported.
Table 4
Study 1: Testing of negative spillover hypotheses, H1-H3

PC

CRS

RVLH

RVLL

CTRLH

CTRLL

5.80 (.82)

4.96 (1.35)

4.38 (1.70)

4.65 (1.23)

4.46 (1.34)

H1: CRS vs. RVL: t (319) = 12.67***
H2: RVL vs. CTRL: t (615.84) = 1.01; RVLH vs. CTRLH: t (318) = 2.20*; RVLL vs.
CTRLL: t (301.76) = -.51.
H3: RVLH vs. RVLL: t (302.21) = 3.43**
NE

4.56 (1.70)

RVLH

RVLL

CTRLH

CTRLL

3.73 (1.86)

3.08 (1.97)

3.35 (1.46)

3.24 (1.41)

H1: CRS vs. RVL: t (319) = 12.00***
H2: RVL vs. CTRL: t (587.10) = .86; RVLH vs. CTRLH: t (301.06) = 2.07*; RVLL vs.
CTRLL: t (287.69) = -.81
H3: RVLH vs. RVLL: t (318) = 3.04**
Note. PC: Perceived crisis; NE: Negative emotions; CRS: Crisis-stricken Brand; RVLH: Rival
brand with high similarity; RVLL: Rival brand with low similarity; CTRLH: Control group for
the high-similarity rival brand; CTRLL: Control group for the low-similarity rival brand
*

p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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Testing of H4 to H6 (Response Strategy Hypotheses)
Before testing H4 to H6, a Pearson correlation analysis was performed to assess the
relationship between blame attribution, attitude towards the crisis response message, brand
attitude, and purchase intention. The results indicated the strengths of the correlations were
moderate to strong (See Table 5). It is worth noting that only the data of crisis news groups (N =
320) were used for this correlation analysis and following hypothesis testing.
Table 5
Study 1: Pearson Correlation Table
1
BLA
AM

2

3

4

-.45**

-.42**

-.29**

.78**

.54**
.74**

BA
PI
Note. BLA: blame attribution; BA: brand attitudes; PI: purchase intention.
*

p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Three hypotheses were proposed to compare the efficacy of a rival brand’s crisis

response strategies with no-response in reducing the impact of the negative spillover from a
brand’s service failure crisis. To test these hypotheses, independent-sample t-tests were
performed. H4 predicted that participants in the denial strategy condition would have (H4a) more
positive brand attitudes and (H4b) higher purchase intention than those in the no-response
condition. Consistent with the prediction, the results showed that participants generated
significantly more favorable brand attitudes when the brand employed a denial strategy (M =
5.37, SD = 1.01) than no response (M = 4.81, SD = 1.21) [t (158) = 3.22, p = .002]. Participants
also generated significantly higher purchase intention when the brand used a denial strategy (M =
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5.04, SD = 1.31) than no response (M = 4.60, SD = 1.49) [t (158) = 1.99, p = .048]. Therefore,
H4a and H4b are corroborated.
H5 predicted that participants in the bolstering strategy condition would have (H5a) more
positive brand attitudes and (H5b) higher purchase intention than those in the no-response
condition. As predicted, participants exposed to the bolstering strategy had more favorable brand
attitudes [bolstering: M = 5.81, SD = 1.21; no-response: M = 4.81, SD = 1.21, t (158) = 5.27, p
< .001] and higher purchase intention [bolstering: M = 5.30, SD = 1.49; no-response: M = 4.60,
SD = 1.49, t (158) = 2.99, p = .003] than those in the no-response condition. Thus, H5a and H5b
are supported.
H6 proposed that participants in the differentiation strategy condition would have (H6a)
more positive brand attitudes and (H6b) higher purchase intention than those in the no-response
condition. The results showed that when using the differentiation strategy, the rival brand could
induce significantly more favorable brand attitudes [differentiation: M = 5.48, SD = 1.17; noresponse: M = 4.81, SD = 1.21, t (158) = 3.60, p < .001] and purchase intention [differentiation:
M = 5.13, SD = 1.43; no-response: M = 4.81, SD = 1.21, t (158) = 5.27, p < .001] than when
using a no-response strategy. Therefore, H6a and H6b are supported.
Testing of H7 and H8 (Interaction Effect: Crisis Response Strategy X Attribute Similarity)
H7 and H8 proposed an interaction effect between two types of crisis response strategies
and attribute similarity on reducing the adverse impacts of perceptual and affective spillover
from a brand’s service failure crisis. H7 predicted that the rival brand with high attribute
similarity to the brand in crisis would induce more positive brand attitudes (H7a) and higher
purchase intention (H7b) when using a differentiation strategy than a bolstering strategy. In
contrast, the rival brand with low attribute similarity to the brand in crisis would induce more
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positive brand attitudes (H8a) and higher purchase intention (H8b) when using a bolstering
strategy than a differentiation strategy.
A two-way ANOVA was performed to test these hypotheses. The results showed no
significant interaction effects on brand attitudes and purchase intention. In other words, using the
differentiation strategy did not generate more positive brand attitudes and higher purchase
intention than using a bolstering strategy for the rival brand of high attribute similarity. As for
the rival brand with low attribute similarity, using the bolstering strategy did not generate better
outcomes in the two dependent variables than using the differentiation strategy. Therefore, H7
and H8 are not supported.
Testing of H9 and H12 (Mediation Hypotheses)
In H9 to H12, theory-based mediation hypotheses were proposed to help explain why a
rival brand’s response using either a bolstering or differentiation strategy would reduce the
adverse impacts of the perceptual and affective spillovers from a brand’s service failure crisis.
To conduct mediation analyses, Model 4 in Hayes’ (2017) SPSS PROCESS macro 3.0 was used.
The indirect effects were tested employing the bootstrap method based on 10,000 resamples
(Hayes, 2015). The variable of crisis response strategy (i.e., bolstering, differentiation, and no
response) was recoded using indicator coding, among which the no-response group served as the
reference group. Table 6 summarizes the results of H9 and H10, and Table 7 summarizes the
results of H11 and H12.
H9 predicted that when the attribute similarity was high, the differentiation strategy
would have a greater positive impact than the bolstering strategy on (H9a) brand attitudes and
(H9b) purchase intention through lower blame attribution. A comparison of the effects of the
response strategy showed that the bolstering strategy significantly reduced blame attribution (b =
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-.48, SE = .19, t = -2.51, p =.013, 95% BC CI: -.58 to -.10), whereas the differentiation strategy
did not. Blame attribution was inversely associated with brand attitudes (b = -.70, SE = .13, t = 5.39, p < .001, 95% BC CI: -.96 to -.44), indicating that the lower the blame attribution, the more
positive the brand attitudes. The direct effect of the bolstering strategy on brand attitudes (b
= .68, SE = .28, t = 2.48, p = .015, 95% BC CI: .14 to 1.23) was significant, whereas that of the
differentiation strategy was not. Finally, the bolstering strategy had a significant indirect effect
on brand attitudes through blame attribution (effect = .34, BootSE = .14, BootCI: .07 to .63).
However, no significant indirect effect of the differentiation strategy on brand attitudes was
found. The difference between the indirect effects of the differentiation and bolstering strategies
was not significant [effects difference (D-B) = -.10, BootSE = .14, BootCI: -.36 to .17)]. H9a is
not supported.
In testing H9b, the same procedure was performed. First, blame attribution had an inverse
effect on purchase intention (b = -.57, SE = .16, t = -3.45, p < .001, 95% BC CI: -.90 to -.24),
indicating the lower the blame attribution, the higher the purchase intention. Unlike the case for
brand attitudes, neither a bolstering nor differentiation strategy had a significant direct effect on
purchase intention. The bolstering strategy had a significant indirect effect on purchase intention
through blame attribution (effect = .27, BootSE = .14, BootCI: .05 to .59). These results indicate
that blame attribution fully mediates the effect of bolstering on purchase intention. However, the
indirect effect of differentiation on purchase intention was not significant. The indirect effect of
the differentiation strategy was significantly lower than that of the bolstering strategy [effects
difference (D-B) = -.08, BootSE = .11, BootCI: -.33 to .13]. Therefore, H9b is not supported.
I also predicted in H10 that when the attribute similarity was low, the bolstering strategy
would have a greater positive impact than the differentiation strategy on (H10a) brand attitudes
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and (H10b) purchase intention through lower blame attribution for the rival brand. The results
showed that the bolstering strategy had a significant direct effect on lowering blame attribution
for the rival brand (i.e., Hotel) (b = -.54, SE = .20, t = -2.71, p =.008, 95% BC CI: -.93 to -.14).
However, no significant direct effect was found for the differentiation strategy. In predicting
brand attitudes, blame attribution had an inverse effect on brand attitudes (b = -.28, SE = .11, t =
-2.70, p = .007, 95% BC CI: -.49 to -.08), suggesting that the lower the blame attribution, the
more positive the brand attitudes. The direct effects of bolstering (b = .84, SE = .23, t = 3.62, p
< .001, 95% BC CI: .38 to 1.30) and differentiation strategies (b = .55, SE = .23, t = 2.41, p
= .018, 95% BC CI: .10 to 1.00) on brand attitudes were significant. In testing the mediation
hypothesis, bolstering had a significant indirect effect on brand attitudes (effect = .15, BootSE
= .09, BootCI: .02 to .36) through lower blame attribution. In contrast, no indirect effect of the
differentiation strategy through blame attribution was found. Taken together, the indirect effect
of the bolstering strategy on brand attitudes was significantly greater than that of the
differentiation strategy [effects difference (B-D) = .06, BootSE = .06, BootCI: -.04 to .21]. These
results do not support H10a.
In predicting purchase intention, no significant effect of blame attribution on purchase
intention was found. This result does not fulfill the necessary condition to observe the mediation
(Baron & Kenny, 1986) and thereby H10b is rejected.
Table 6
Study 1: The relative indirect effects of crisis response strategies through blame attribution on
brand attitudes and purchase intention across different attribute similarity levels
High Similarity
Mediator
variable model

BLA (M)
R2 = .05; F (2,117) = 3.31, p = .040
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b (SE)

t

95% CI

Constant

4.13 (.13)

30.73***

3.87 – 4.40

X1

-.48 (.19)

-2.51*

-.85 – -.10

X2

-.33 (.14)

-1.75

-.71 – .04

Dependent
variable model

BA (Y)

PI (Y)

R2 = .28; F (3,116) = 14.74, p < .001

R2 = .12; F (3,116) = 5.51, p = .001

b (SE)

t

95% CI

b (SE)

t

95% CI

Constant

7.56 (.57)

13.23***

6.43 – 8.69

6.70 (.73)

9.20***

5.25 – 8.14

X1

.68 (.28)

2.48*

.14 – 1.23

.38 (.35)

1.07

-.32 – 1.07

X2

.48 (.27)

1.76

-.06 – 1.02

.43 (.35)

1.23

-.26 – 1.11

M

-.70 (.13)

-5.39***

-.96 – -.44

-.57 (.16)

-3.45***

-.90 – -.24

Indirect effect

Effect (BootSE)

Boot 95% CI

Effect (BootSE)

Boot 95% CI

X1MY

.34 (.14)

.07 – .63

.27 (.14)

.05 – .59

X2MY

.23 (.14)

-.03 – .52

.19 (.14)

-.01 – .51

Low Similarity
Mediator

BLM (M)
R2 = .06; F (2,117) = 3.73, p = .027

variable model
b (SE)

t

95% CI

Constant

4.95 (.15)

33.45***

4.66 – 5.24

X1

.95 (.21)

4.54***

.54 – 1.36

X2

.83 (.21)

3.94***

.41 – 1.24

Dependent
variable model

BA (Y)

PI (Y)

R2 = .19; F (3,116) = 9.10, p < .001

R2 = .07; F (3,116) = 2.94, p = .036

b (SE)

t

95% CI

b (SE)

t

95% CI

Constant

6.04 (.43)

13.99***

5.19 – 6.90

5.57 (.55)

10.06***

4.47 – 6.66

X1

.84 (.23)

3.62***

-.13 – .48

.66 (.30)

2.21*

.07 – 1.25

X2

-.07 (.15)

-.45

-.38 – .24

.40 (.29)

1.36

-.18 – .98

M

.86 (.06)

13.49***

.74 – .99

-.18 (.14)

-1.36

-.45 – .08

Indirect effect

Effect (BootSE)

Boot 95% CI

Effect (BootSE)

Boot 95% CI

.82 (.18)

.47 – 1.18

.10 (.08)

-.03 – .29

X1MY
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X2MY

.71 (.20)

.34 – 1.12

.06 (.06)

-.02 – .23

Note. 95% CI indicates bias-corrected bootstrap (10,000 resample) confidence interval. X1:
bolstering strategy; X2: differentiation strategy; BLA: blame attribution; BA: brand attitudes; PI:
purchase intention.
*

p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
I also posited two mediation hypotheses regarding the role of attitudes toward the crisis

response message in the effect of the response strategy on brand attitudes and purchase intention.
More specifically, H11 predicted that when the attribute similarity is high, the differentiation
strategy would have a greater positive impact than the bolstering strategy on (H11a) brand
attitudes and (H11b) purchase intention through higher attitudes toward the message. Both
bolstering (b = 1.28, SE = .28, t = 4.52, p <.001, 95% BC CI: .72 to 1.84) and differentiation (b
= .88, SE = .28, t = 3.08, p = .003, 95% BC CI: .31 to 1.44) had a significant direct effect on
attitudes toward the message. The results indicate either of the two strategies could induce
positive attitudes toward the response message from the rival brand with attributes that are
similar to the brand in crisis. In predicting brand attitudes, the mediator—attitudes toward the
message—had a positive effect on brand attitudes (b = .77, SE = .07, t = 11.64, p < .001, 95%
BC CI: .64 to .90). The direct effect of the bolstering and differentiation strategies on brand
attitudes were not significant. In testing the mediation hypothesis, both the bolstering strategy
(effect = .99, BootSE = .27, BootCI: .49 to 1.55) and differentiation strategy (effect = .68,
BootSE = .23, BootCI: .26 to 1.16) had significant indirect effects on brand attitudes through
attitudes toward the message. However, the indirect effect of the differentiation strategy was not
significantly greater than that of the bolstering strategy [effects difference (D-B) = -.31, BootSE
= .22, BootCI: -.77 to .11]. Therefore, H11a is not supported.
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In predicting purchase intention, attitudes toward the message had a significant effect on
purchase intention (b = .64, SE = .10, t = 6.30, p < .001, 95% BC CI: .44 to .84). The direct
effects of the bolstering and differentiation strategies on purchase intention were not significant.
In testing the mediation hypothesis, the differentiation strategy (effect = .56, BootSE = .21,
BootCI: .18 to 1.02) did not have a significantly greater indirect effect than the bolstering
strategy (effect = .81, BootSE = .26, BootCI: .35 to 1.38) on purchase intention through attitudes
toward the message [effects difference (D-B) = -.26, BootSE = .19, BootCI: -.66 to .07]. Thus,
H11b is not corroborated.
H12 predicted that when the attribute similarity is low, the bolstering strategy would have
a greater positive impact than the differentiation strategy on (H12a) brand attitudes and (H12b)
purchase intention through higher attitudes toward the message. Both the bolstering strategy (b
= .95, SE = .21, t = 4.54, p <.001, 95% BC CI: .54 to 1.36) and differentiation strategy (b = .83,
SE = .21, t = 3.94, p < .001, 95% BC CI: .41 to 1.24) had a positive effect on attitudes toward the
message. Attitudes toward the crisis response message also had a positive effect on brand
attitudes (b = .86, SE = .06, t = 13.49, p < .001, 95% BC CI: .74 to .99). The direct effects of
bolstering and differentiation on brand attitudes were not significant. Instead, there were
significant indirect effects of the bolstering strategy (effect = .82, BootSE = .18, BootCI: .47 to
1.18) and differentiation strategy (effect = .71, BootSE = .20, BootCI: .34 to 1.12) on brand
attitudes through attitudes toward the message. These results indicate that when attribute
similarity is low, the effect of a crisis response strategy on brand attitudes is fully mediated
through attitudes toward the message. In testing the relative power of bolstering and
differentiation, the difference of the indirect effects between the differentiation and bolstering
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strategies was not statistically significant [effects difference (B-D) = .11, BootSE = .18, BootCI:
-.26 to .44)]. Therefore, H12a is not supported.
In predicting purchase intention, attitudes toward the crisis response message had a
positive effect on purchase intention (b = .87, SE = .10, t = 8.75, p < .001, 95% BC CI: .68 to
1.07). The direct effects of the bolstering and differentiation strategies on purchase intention
were not significant. The indirect effects of the bolstering strategy (effect = .63, BootSE = .14,
BootCI: .35 to .92) and differentiation strategy (effect = .54, BootSE = .15, BootCI: .27 to .85)
through attitudes toward the message were significant. However, the difference in the indirect
effects between differentiation and bolstering was not statistically significant [effects difference
(B-D) = .11, BootSE = .18, BootCI: -.25 to .47]. Thus, H12b is not corroborated.
Table 7
Study 1: The relative indirect effects of crisis response strategies through attitudes toward the
crisis response message on brand attitudes and purchase intention across different attribute
similarity levels
High Similarity
Mediator

AM (M)
R2 = .05; F (2,237) = 6.83, p = .001

variable model
b (SE)

T

95% CI

Constant

3.97 (.10)

40.35***

3.78 – 4.16

X1

-.51 (.14)

-3.64***

-.78 – -.23

X2

-.33 (.14)

-2.38*

-.61 – -.06

Dependent
variable model

BA (Y)

PI (Y)

R2 = .58; F (3,116) = 53.93, p < .001

R2 = .28; F (3,116) = 15.07, p < .001

b (SE)

t

95% CI

b (SE)

t

95% CI

Constant

1.02 (.34)

2.96**

.34 – 1.70

1.33 (.52)

2.55*

.30 – 2.37

X1

.03 (.22)

.13

-.41 – .47

-.16 (.34)

-.49

-.83 – .50
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X2

.04 (.21)

.17

-.38 – .46

.40 (.23)

1.75

-.58 – .70

M

.77 (.07)

11.64***

.64 – .90

.64 (.10)

6.30***

.44 – .84

Indirect effect

Effect (BootSE)

Boot 95% CI

Effect (BootSE)

Boot 95% CI

X1MY

.99 (.27)

.49 – 1.55

.81 (.26)

.35 – 1.38

X2MY

.68 (.23)

.25 – 1.14

.56 (.21)

.18 – 1.02

Low Similarity
Mediator

AM (M)
R2 = .17; F (2,117) = 12.17, p < .001

variable model
b (SE)

t

95% CI

Constant

4.95 (.15)

33.45***

4.65 – 5.24

X1

.95 (.21)

4.54***

.54 – 1.36

X2

.83 (.21)

3.94***

.41 – 1.24

Dependent
variable model

BA (Y)

PI (Y)

R2 = .66; F (3,116) = 76.72, p < .001

R2 = .43; F (3,116) = 29.31, p < .001

b (SE)

t

95% CI

b (SE)

t

95% CI

Constant

.68 (.33)

2.03*

.02 – 1.34

.54 (.52)

1.04

-.49 – 1.57

X1

.17 (.16)

1.09

-.14 – .48

-.07 (.25)

-.29

-.56 – .41

X2

-.07 (.15)

.45

-.38 – .23

-.26 (.24)

-1.09

-.74 – .21

M

.86 (.06)

13.49***

.74 – .99

.87 (.10)

8.75***

.68 – 1.07

Indirect effect

Effect (BootSE)

Boot 95% CI

Effect (BootSE)

Boot 95% CI

X1MY

.82 (.18)

.47 – 1.18

.63 (.14)

.35 – .92

X2MY

.71 (.20)

.34 – 1.12

.54 (.15)

.27 – .85

Note. 95% CI indicates bias-corrected bootstrap (10,000 resample) confidence interval. X1:
bolstering strategy; X2: differentiation strategy; AM: attitudes toward the crisis response
message; BA: brand attitude; PI: purchase intention.
*

p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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Discussion of Study 1
Study 1 examined whether perceptions and emotions towards a brand crisis due to a
brand’s service failure would spill over to its rival brands within the same industry. Although
many studies have examined negative spillover effects, few studies have explored how
perceptions and emotions toward the brand in crisis are transferred to other brands before
examining the business effects of a negative spillover. In terms of perceptual impacts, Roehm
and Tybout (2006) compared negative beliefs about a brand in the fast-food industry and its
competitors before and after a brand crisis. They assumed that the changes in category beliefs
and competitor beliefs would show a spillover effect. Dahlén and Lange (2006) compared the
perceived risk of the entire banking industry and the attitude and trust toward rival banks
between consumers who read crisis news of a bank and the other consumers. They supposed that
the increase of the category risk and the decrease of brand attitudes and trust of rival brands
would show a spillover effect.
The current research took a different approach. I defined a spillover crisis as a brand’s
crisis affecting consumers’ perceptions about the crisis and their negative emotions towards other
brands within the same business category or industry. Applying this definition, a brand spillover
crisis can be operationally defined as follows. For a brand in crisis, the perceptions of risk and
negative emotions toward a crisis-stricken brand’s rival brands within the same business
category will be greater for those who are aware of the brand’s service failure or product-harm
crisis than those who are unaware of the crisis. Based on this conceptual and operational
definition, I compared the perception of the crisis and negative emotions toward the rival brand
between participants exposed to news about the crisis and those who were not exposed. To
observe the spillover crisis, I predicted the following: First, participants exposed to news of a
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brand’s service failure would perceive a greater crisis and negative emotions toward the brand in
crisis than those who were not exposed to the news. This prediction is so obvious that I did not
explicitly state it as a hypothesis. Second and most importantly, the perceived crisis and negative
emotions toward the rival brand should be significantly higher for those who are aware of the
crisis than those who are not aware of the crisis. Lastly, perceived crisis and negative emotions
toward the rival brand should be smaller than or statistically equal to the crisis-stricken brand.
Study 1 provided empirical evidence for a brand crisis spillover effect in the context of a
corporate ability crisis. Based on a real-world crisis in which hidden cameras were found in a
home-sharing brand, Study 1 examined whether there would be a spillover crisis to another
home-sharing rental brand or a hotel brand. The results revealed that the magnitude of crisis
perceptions and negative emotions toward the crisis-stricken brand was stronger than toward the
rival brands in two different attribute similarities. As predicted, participants who were exposed to
news about a brand crisis perceived a greater crisis and more negative emotions toward the rival
brand with high similarity (i.e., another home-sharing rental brand) than those who were not
exposed to the news. In contrast, no statistical differences were found in perceived crisis and
negative emotions towards the rival brand with low similarity (i.e., a hotel brand) between
participants exposed to news of the crisis and those who were not exposed to the news. There
were significant differences in perceived crisis and negative emotions toward the high-similarity
rival brand (i.e., another home-sharing brand) and the low-similarity rival brand (i.e., hotel
brand). These results indicate that the negative spillover effects were evident for another homesharing brand but not for the hotel brand. Taken together, the negative perceptions and emotions
aroused by a brand crisis can spill over to a rival brand with high attribute similarity to the brand
in crisis. The results of this study call for further discussion on why the brand crisis did not spill

71

over to the rival brand with low attribute similarity. One possibility is that participants may
believe that the same event could occur for another home-sharing brand for different reasons
than for hotel brands. In particular, among the three dimensions of blame attribution proposed by
Weiner (1985), it appears that participants in Study 1 did not relate the incident to the hotel with
the same attribution of responsibility in terms of controllability and stability as they did to
another home-sharing brand. I also conducted a post-hoc analysis to compare the three
attribution dimensions for the two rival brands. For the stability dimension, participants believed
that the same incident would be less likely to occur at a hotel than at another home-sharing rental
in the future. For the controllability dimension, a hotel was perceived to have higher
controllability to prevent the same incident from happening than the home-sharing rental. The
participants’ perception that the crisis in the home-sharing rental brand would not spill over to
the hotel brand was probably because participants found it difficult to construct any causal
explanation for the hotel brand experiencing a similar negative event.
After confirming the brand crisis spillover to a high-similarity rival brand, I examined
whether the rival brand would reduce the negative impacts from the spillover by showing the
participants the rival brand’s response message. In their seminal study, Roehm and Tybout
(2006) found that if a rival brand experienced a spillover crisis, a denial strategy could help the
brand reduce the negative effects of the crisis compared to having no response. When there were
no negative spillover effects, issuing a denial induced a boomerang effect that harmed the brand
compared to having no response. Based on Roehm and Tybout’s findings, I conducted a post-hoc
analysis to examine the efficacy of response strategies for rival brands with different similarity
levels and particularly to determine if the response strategy would still be effective for the lowsimilarity group. Under the high-attribute similarity conditions, responding with denial,
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bolstering, or differentiation strategies significantly increased the favorable brand attitudes and
purchase intention compared to no response. Under the low-attribute similarity conditions, the
bolstering and differentiation strategies performed better for the two dependent variables
compared to no response. However, no difference was found between issuing a denial and no
response for both dependent variables. On the one hand, the results seem to be consistent with
Roehm and Tybout’s (2006) research in which issuing a denial statement did not have a positive
effect when there was no spillover effect. On the other hand, denial did not have any boomerang
effect. Instead, I found that the effects of the denial strategy on the two dependent variables were
not different from the baseline measure through the control group. Borah and Tellis (2016)
indicated that brand managers seem to believe it is wise to maintain a “lying low” strategy and
wait for the storm to pass when other brands are hit by a crisis. The results of Study 1 indicate
that issuing a response to another brand’s crisis is more effective in mitigating the negative
impacts from a potential spillover effect than no response. This finding suggests that the
common practice in public relations to avoid unnecessary comparison with a brand in crisis and
lying as low as possible is, in fact, ineffective. The results of this study have important
implications for scholars and managers in crisis communication.
Study 1 did not find a significant interaction effect between the two types of crisis
response strategies (i.e., bolstering and differentiation) and attribute similarity on brand attitudes
and purchase intention. The lack of significance is probably because the negative spillover
effects did not occur in one of the conditions—the low-similarity rival brand. The results showed
that participants in the hotel condition had more favorable brand attitudes and higher purchase
intention than those in the home-sharing rental condition. Furthermore, the results indicated that
the differentiation strategy used by the high-similarity rival brand did not yield any better
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performance than the bolstering strategy. This finding suggests that the differentiation strategy
may not be effective in inducing the contrast effects when the two brands are perceived to have a
high similarity in the crisis attribute. A crisis attribute or “scandal attribute” (p. 367) refers to the
product/service attribute that becomes the cause of the crisis (Roehm & Tybout, 2006). In homesharing rentals, the independent partnership between each host (the owner of the property) and
the broker can be a major crisis attribute of hidden camera incidents. This fundamental business
model of home-sharing rentals makes them vulnerable to similar negative incidences. All homesharing rentals are highly similar to each other in this crisis attribute. It is hard for people to
believe that other home-sharing brands could have done differently. Therefore, the
differentiation strategy did not generate the expected contrast effect in Study 1. Put it differently,
the differentiation strategy did not successfully distinguish itself from the crisis-stricken brand in
terms of the hidden camera incident. The similarity in the crisis attribute overshadowed the effect
of the differentiation strategy in protecting consumers’ evaluation of the high-similarity brand.
Study 1 also showed that blame attribution and attitudes toward the response message
mediated the effects of the crisis response strategy on brand attitudes and purchase intention.
Both the bolstering and differentiation strategies induced more positive attitudes toward the crisis
response message than no response, while also lowering blame attribution. As a result,
participants who were exposed to either type of message had more positive brand attitudes and
higher purchase intention than those who were not. The result also revealed that the attitude
toward the message was a stronger mediator than blame attribution in yielding more positive
brand attitudes and higher purchase intention during the brand spillover crisis. Attitudes toward
the response message fully mediated the relationship between the crisis response strategies and
the two dependent variables in both high- and low-similarity conditions.
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In summary, the results of Study 1 are inconsistent with my prediction of whether lowsimilarity rival brands experience negative spillover effects. In my prediction, a low-similarity
rival brand is affected by negative spillover effects as well because it shares the defining
attributes of the business category with the crisis brand at least. However, as discussed above,
participants did not place blame on the low-similarity rival brand (a hotel) in terms of hiddencamera incidents, and therefore the low-similarity rival brand was not affected by negative
spillovers. I raise the two presumptions for this result: (1) a rival brand sharing the low attribute
similarity with the crisis-stricken brand may not find a significant spillover effect; and (2) if a
rival brand does not share the crisis attribute as the brand in crisis, it would not have negative
spillover effects. In other words, the similarity in crisis attribute is the key to determine if a rival
brand experiences negative spillover effects. A further study is needed to test these two
presumptions. Furthermore, Study 1 failed to find supporting evidence of the interaction
hypotheses for different response strategies based on different levels of attribute similarity. It is
unclear under which situation that making sharp comparisons (i.e., using the differentiation
strategy) with the brand in crisis is better for a high-similarity rival brand to protect itself from
negative spillover effects, and if the similarity in the crisis attribute can always offset the contrast
effect from the differentiation strategy by a high-similarity rival brand.
To further understand the negative spillover effects for low-similarity rival brands and
study the relative efficacy of response strategies, I conduct Study 2 while addressing the
limitations of Study 1. First, Study 2 uses a different spillover crisis scenario in which the crisis
attribute is applicable to both high- and low-similarity rival brands. This is unlike Study 1, where
the crisis attribute seems not to apply to the low-similarity rival brand. In addition, Study 2
changes the way brand attribute similarity is displayed in the experimental stimulus. In Study 1,
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all participants read the same online article about the service attributes of the crisis-stricken
brand and two rival brands. When the information of two rival brands is provided in the same
article, people are likely to produce a contrast between two rival brands and amplify the
perceived difference between the low-similarity rival brand and the crisis-stricken brand.
However, I think the stimulus’ emphasis should be placed on the rival brand’s lower similarity
with the crisis-stricken brand rather than its differences from the crisis-stricken brand. Therefore,
in Study 2, participants only read the information about the rival brand that they are assigned to
and the crisis-stricken brand. Meanwhile, the same industry membership of the crisis-stricken
brand and the rival brand is highlighted in the stimulus.
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Chapter 5: Study 2
Overview
Study 2 replicated Study 1 and employed a 2 (Attribute similarity: high, low) by 4 (Crisis
response strategy: bolstering, differentiation, denial, and no response) between-subjects factorial
design. Similar to Study 1, the crisis scenario in Study 2 was also a service failure crisis. Study 2
emulated a real-world crisis in the banking sector (Cambon et al., 2020), which was caused by
massive debit card fraud. The crisis-stricken brand was a traditional bank (Wealth Central Bank),
and the two competitors were a traditional bank (IDPC Bank) and a financial technology
company (MoneyNiffler).
Stimuli
Participants were exposed to three stimuli in the following order: (1) an article on Forbes’
website featuring traditional banks and fintech companies, (2) a New York Times article
covering the massive debit card fraud that hit a tradition bank (i.e., Wealth Central Bank), and
(3) a response message from one of the two rival brands with different attribute similarities (See
Appendix C).
Participants were randomly assigned to different attribute similarity groups and were
asked to read different Forbes article versions. Those in the high-similarity group read the article,
entitled Traditional Banks, which only presented information about two traditional banks
(Wealth Central Bank, IDPC Bank). In contrast, those in the low-similarity group read an article,
entitled Traditional Bank and Fintech Company, which presented information about a traditional
bank (Wealth Central Bank) and a fintech company (MoneyNiffler). Both articles included a
table that summarized the features of traditional banks and fintech companies on how they
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conducted business, the payment method, working hours, fees, services, regulations, and security
measures.
The brand crisis was described in a New York Times article, entitled Outrage Mounts
After Wealth Central Bank Denies Claims From Victim Of Its Bank Card Scammers. The article
reported that Wealth Central Bank had frozen a massive number of accounts because the bank
was suspicious of fraudulent activity in the last two months. This crisis scenario was chosen
because both traditional banks and fintech companies are susceptible to this type of incident as
they issue debit cards.
The crisis response messages were created as a Facebook post for the rival brand. The
crisis response messages had the same format as in Study 1: a bolstering message strategy versus
a differentiation message strategy. The bolstering message emphasized the rival brand’s past
success in preventing debit card fraud. Specifically, the brand highlighted its security
technology, fraud detection, and consumer service efforts to achieve a low debit card fraud rate.
In the differentiation message, the rival brand directly mentioned the brand name of the crisisstricken company and compared its own efforts with the crisis-stricken brand regarding security
technology, fraud detection, and consumer service under the subtitles of “What Wealth Central
Bank does” and “What we do it differently.” The denial message emphasized the brand’s low
debit card fraud rate and confidence in preventing fraud in the future.
Procedure
A total of 672 participants were recruited from MTurk and randomly assigned to the
different groups. Specifically, the number of participants in the crisis groups was 336, with 42
participants in each group. The no crisis groups had a total of 336 participants, with 168
participants in each group. The experiment procedures were identical to those in Study 1.
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Notably, the negative spillover hypotheses (H1 to H3) were tested by the data of all 672
participants. The hypotheses (H4 to H12) related to the efficacy of response strategies were
tested by the data of participants exposed to the crisis news (N = 336).
Table 8
Study 2: The experiment procedure and number of participants in each group
Group

# of

Procedure

participants

Part 1

Part 2

1

N=42

High attribute similarity article – Crisis news – Bolstering

2

N=42

High attribute similarity article – Crisis news – Differentiation

3

N=42

High attribute similarity article – Crisis news – Denial

4

N=42

High attribute similarity article – Crisis news – No response (Control)

5

N=42

Low attribute similarity article – Crisis news – Bolstering

6

N=42

Low attribute similarity article – Crisis news – Differentiation

7

N=42

Low attribute similarity article – Crisis news – Denial

8

N=42

Low attribute similarity article – Crisis news – No response (Control)

9

N=168

High attribute similarity article – No crisis news (Control)

10

N=168

Low attribute similarity article – No crisis news (Control)

Measures
The measures were the same as those used in Study 1, including measures for perceived
crisis (crisis-stricken brand: M = 5.11, SD = 1.24, α = .89; rival brand: M = 4.79, SD = 1.38, α
= .92), negative emotions (crisis-stricken brand: M = 3.90, SD = 1.78, α = .97; rival brand: M =
3.46, SD = 1.82, α = .98), blame attribution (M = 4.19, SD = .81, α = .78), attitudes toward the
crisis response message (M = 5.43, SD = 1.14, α = .90), brand attitude (M = 5.45, SD = 1.17, α
= .91), and purchase intention (M = 5.26, SD = 1.42, α = .91). Seven-point scales were used for
all of the measures (See Appendix A).

79

Manipulation check
The same manipulation checks as in Study 1 were used for both the similarity level and
crisis response strategy. Regarding the overall similarity, the results of Welch’s t tests indicated
that people perceived that the overall similarity of IDPC Bank (traditional bank, rival brand) (M
= 5.53, SD = .95) to Wealth Central Bank (traditional bank, crisis-stricken brand) was
significantly higher than that of MoneyNiffler (fintech company, rival brand) (M = 4.33, SD =
1.48) [t (571.14) = 12.43, p <.001]. In addition, the attribute similarity of IDPC Bank (M = 4.07,
SD = .69) to Wealth Central Bank was significantly higher than that of MoneyNiffler (M = 2.67,
SD = 1.16) [t (545.18) = 19.00, p < .001].
In terms of the crisis response strategy, the results of Welch’s ANOVA showed that the
three strategy groups were significantly different from one another on the four items that
captured the characteristics of the differentiation strategy [F (2,159.55) = 20.96, p < .001].
Among them, participants in the differentiation group (M = 5.96, SD = .75) exhibited the highest
agreement, followed by the denial group (M = 5.41, SD = .83), and participants in the bolstering
group (M = 4.99, SD = 1.32) exhibited the lowest agreement. On the two items that captured the
characteristics of the denial strategy, participants in the denial group (M = 5.58, SD = .83)
exhibited significantly higher agreement than those in the differentiation group (M = 5.08, SD =
1.27) and the bolstering group (M = 4.67, SD = 1.55) [Welch’s F (2,155.09) = 12.94, p < .001].
Both manipulations were successful.
Results
Testing of H1 to H3 (Negative Spillover Hypotheses)
H1 and H2 predicted that participants exposed to news of the crisis would have (a) a
higher perception of the crisis and (b) negative emotions towards the rival brand than those who
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were not exposed to the news, regardless of how similar the rival brand was to the crisis-stricken
brand. As predicted, participants exposed to the crisis news (M = 5.28, SD = 1.05) had a
significantly higher perception of the crisis for the highly similar rival brand than brands that
were not similar (M = 4.33, SD = 1.48) [t (301.18) = 6.77, p <.001]. In addition, participants
exposed to the crisis news expressed more negative emotions (M = 3.86, SD = 1.75) toward the
rival brand that was highly similar than brands that were not similar (M = 3.02, SD = 1.82) [t
(334) = 4.33, p <.001]. For the low-similarity rival brand, participants exposed to the crisis news
also had a significantly higher perception of the crisis (crisis news group: M = 5.18, SD = 1.06;
control group: M = 4.33, SD = 1.54) [t (296.06) = 5.86, p <.001] and more negative emotions
towards the low-similarity rival brand (crisis news group: M = 3.93, SD = 1.78; control group: M
= 3.04, SD = 1.75) [t (344) = 4.67, p <.001] than participants in the control group who were not
exposed to the crisis news. The results indicated that there were negative spillover effects for the
rival brand regardless of the similarity level. Therefore, both H1 and H2 are supported.
H3 predicted that participants would have (H3a) a higher perception of the crisis and
(H3b) more negative emotions toward the high-similarity rival brand than the low-similarity rival
brand. However, the results of the independent-sample t-tests showed that there were no
significant differences in perceived crisis and negative emotions between the high-similarity and
low-similarity rival brands. Therefore, H3a and H3b are not supported. Table 8 summarizes the
results of H1 to H3.
Table 9
Study 2: Testing of negative spillover hypotheses, H1-H3

PC

CRS

RVLH

RVLL

CTRLH

CTRLL

5.65 (.79)

5.28 (1.05)

5.18 (1.06)

4.33 (1.48)

4.33 (1.54)
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H1a: RVLH vs. CTRLH: t (301.18) = 6.77***
H2a: RVLL vs. CTRLL = t (296.06) = 5.86***
H3a: RVLH vs. RVLL: t (334) = .83
NE

4.64 (1.50)

RVLH

RVLL

CTRLH

CTRLL

3.86 (1.74)

3.93 (1.78)

3.02 (1.82)

3.03 (1.75)

H1b: RVLH vs. CTRLH: t (334) = 4.33***
H2b: RVLL vs. CTRLL: t (334) = 4.67***
H3b: RVLH vs. RVLL: t (334) = -.36
Note. PC: Perceived crisis; NE: Negative emotions; CRS: Crisis-stricken brand; RVLH: Rival
brand with high similarity; RVLL: Rival brand with low similarity; CTRLH: Control group for
the high similarity rival brand; CTRLL: Control group for the high similarity rival brand
*

p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Testing of H4 to H6 (Response Strategy Hypotheses)
Prior to testing the hypotheses related to the efficacy of response strategies, a Pearson
correlation analysis was performed using the data of crisis news groups (N = 336). Table 10
presents the correlations table for blame attribution, attitude towards the crisis response message,
brand attitude, and purchase intention.
Table 10
Study 2: Pearson Correlation Table
1
BLA
AM

2

3

4

-.36**

-.36**

-.21**

.80**

.66**

BA
PI
Note. BLA: blame attribution; BA: brand attitudes; PI: purchase intention.
*

p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

.79**
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H4 to H6 compared the efficacy of the denial, bolstering, and differentiation strategies
with no response in mitigating the impact of negative spillover effects on brand attitudes and
purchase intention. Independent-sample t-tests were performed to test these hypotheses. H4
predicted that participants in the denial strategy condition would have (H4a) more favorable
brand attitudes and (H4b) higher purchase intention than those in the no-response condition.
Consistent with the prediction of H4, participants had significantly more favorable brand
attitudes when the rival brand employed the denial strategy (M = 5.38, SD = 1.04) than when the
brand had no response (M = 4.89, SD = 1.17) [t (166) = 2.89, p = .004]. However, participant did
not have significantly higher purchase intention when the brand issued a denial (M = 5.24, SD =
1.36) compared to no response (M = 4.84, SD = 1.50) [t (166) = 1.83, p = .069]. These results
support H4a, but not H4b.
H5 predicted that participants in the bolstering strategy condition would have more
favorable brand attitudes (H5a) and higher purchase intention (H5b) than those in the noresponse condition. H5 predicted that participants would have more positive brand attitudes
when the brand responded using the bolstering strategy (M = 5.80, SD = .99) compared to no
response (M = 4.89, SD = 1.17) [t (166) = 2.74, p < .001]. Furthermore, participants exposed to
the bolstering strategy (M = 5.45, SD = 1.41) had higher purchase intention than those in the noresponse condition (M = 4.84, SD = 1.50) [t (166) = 2.74, p = .007]. Thus, H5a and H5b are
supported.
H6 proposed that participants in the differentiation strategy condition would have more
positive brand attitudes (H6a) and higher purchase intention (H6b) than those in the no-response
condition. As H6 predicted, the differentiation strategy (M = 5.71, SD = 1.25) induced more
favorable brand attitudes than no response (M = 4.89, SD = 1.17) [t (166) = 4.41, p < .001]. In
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addition, people in the differentiation message condition (M = 5.51, SD = 1.35) exhibited higher
purchase intention than those in the no-response condition (M = 4.84, SD = 1.50) [t (166) = 3.07,
p = .003]. Therefore, H6a and H6b are supported.
Testing of H7 and H8 (Interaction Effect: Crisis Response Strategy X Attribute Similarity)
H7 predicted that the high-similarity rival brand would induce more favorable brand
attitudes (H7a) and higher purchase intention (H7b) when using the differentiation strategy than
the bolstering strategy. H8 predicted that the low-similarity rival brand would induce (H8a) more
favorable brand attitudes and (H8b) higher purchase intention when using the bolstering strategy
than the differentiation strategy. A two-way ANOVA was employed to test these interaction
effects.
The results showed a significant interaction effect of the two crisis response strategies
and attribute similarity on brand attitudes [F (1,164) = 6.90, p =. 009]. However, the interaction
effect was not significant for purchase intention. The results indicated that for the high-similarity
rival brand, participants exhibited more favorable brand attitudes when the brand used the
differentiation strategy (M = 5.98, SD = .76) compared to the bolstering strategy (M = 5.63, SD
= 1.16) (See Figure 4). In contrast, for the low-similarity rival brand, participants had more
favorable brand attitudes when the brand used the bolstering strategy (M = 5.99, SD = .77) than
the differentiation strategy (M = 5.44, SD = 1.55). These results support H7a and H8a, but not
H7b and H8b.
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Figure 4
The Interaction Effects of Crisis Response Strategy and Attribute Similarity on Brand Attitudes

Testing of H9 and H12 (Mediation Hypotheses)
H9 predicted that when the attribute similarity was high, the differentiation strategy
compared to the bolstering strategy would have a greater positive impact on brand attitudes
(H9a) and purchase intention (H9b) through blame attribution. Before testing H9, I checked the
direct effects of the independent variable on the mediator and the dependent variables as well as
the direct effect of the mediator on the dependent variables, respectively. The bolstering (b =
-.48, SE = .16, t = -3.08, p =.003, 95% BC CI: -.79 to -.17) and differentiation strategies (b =
-.54, SE = .16, t = -3.46, p < .001, 95% BC CI: -.85 to -.23) significantly reduced blame
attribution, the mediator. In predicting brand attitudes, blame attribution had an inverse effect on
the dependent variable (b = -.39, SE = .14, t = -2.88, p = .005, 95% BC CI: -.66 to -.12), meaning
that the lower the blame attribution, the more favorable the brand attitudes. Furthermore, both
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the differentiation strategy (b = 1.00, SE = .25, t = 4.02, p <.001, 95% BC CI: .51 to 1.49) and
bolstering strategy (b = .66, SE = .25, t = 2.68, p =.009, 95% BC CI: .17 to 1.14) had a positive
direct effect on brand attitudes. In testing H9, the differentiation strategy (effect = .21, BootSE
= .10, BootCI: .04 to .44) and bolstering strategy (effect = .19, BootSE = .10, BootCI: .03 to .42)
had a significant indirect effect on brand attitudes through blame attribution, respectively.
However, the difference between the indirect effects of the differentiation and bolstering
strategies were not statistically significant [effects difference (D-B) = .02, BootSE = .07, BootCI:
-.11 to .19]. Therefore, H9a is not supported. In predicting purchase intention, blame attribution
did not have a significant effect on the dependent variable, which does not meet the necessary
condition to observe a mediation effect. In addition, the indirect effect of the differentiation and
bolstering strategies on brand attitudes through blame attribution was not significant. Thus, H9b
is not supported.
H10 predicted that when the attribute similarity is low, the bolstering strategy would have
a greater positive impact on brand attitudes (H10a) and purchase intention (H10b) through lower
blame attribution than the bolstering strategy. Before testing H10, I examined the direct effects
of the independent variable on the mediator and the dependent variables as well as the direct
effect of the mediator on the dependent variables. The results showed that the bolstering strategy
(b = -.54, SE = .20, t = -2.71, p =.008, 95% BC CI: -.93 to -.14) had a significant effect on blame
attribution, whereas the differentiation strategy did not. Blame attribution also had an inverse
effect on brand attitudes (b = -.38, SE = .11, t = -3.54, p < .001, 95% BC CI: -.59 to -.17). The
direct effects of the bolstering strategy (b = .84, SE = .23, t = 3.62, p < .001, 95% BC CI: .38 to
1.30) on brand attitudes was significant, whereas that of the differentiation strategy was not.
Only the indirect effect of the bolstering strategy (effect = .17, BootSE = .09, BootCI: .01 to .37)
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through blame attribution was significant. However, the indirect effects of the bolstering strategy
were not significantly greater than that of the differentiation strategy [effects difference (B-D)
= .03, BootSE = .09, BootCI: -.13 to .21]. Therefore, H10a is not supported.
In predicting purchase intention, the effect of blame attribution on purchase intention was
significant (b = -.27, SE = .13, t = -2.00, p = .047, 95% BC CI: -.54 to -.003). However, the
indirect effects of the bolstering and differentiation strategies through blame attribution were not
significant. Thus, H10b is not corroborated.
Table 11
Study 2: The relative indirect effects of crisis response strategies through blame attribution on
brand attitudes and purchase intention across different attribute similarity levels
High Similarity
Mediator

BLA (M)
R2 = .10; F (2,123) = 7.21, p = .001

variable model
b (SE)

t

95% CI

Constant

4.51 (.11)

40.88***

4.29 – 4.73

X1

-.48 (.16)

-3.08**

-.79 – -.17

X2

-.54 (.16)

-3.46***

-.85 – -.23

Dependent
variable model

BA (Y)

PI (Y)

R2 = .23; F (3,122) = 11.94, p < .001

R2 = .09; F (3,122) = 3.81, p = .012

b (SE)

t

95% CI

b (SE)

t

95% CI

Constant

6.33 (.64)

10.27***

5.29 – 7.82

6.21 (.85)

7.30***

4.53 – 7.90

X1

.66 (.25)

2.68**

.17 – 1.14

.37 (.33)

1.12

-.28 – 1.02

X2

1.00 (.25)

4.02***

.51 – 1.48

.75 (.33)

2.28*

.10 – 1.41

M

-.39 (.14)

-2.88**

-.66 – -.12

-.31 (.18)

-1.69

-.67 – .05

Indirect effect

Effect (BootSE)

Boot 95% CI

Effect (BootSE)

Boot 95% CI

X1MY

.19 (.10)

.03 – .42

.15 (.11)

-.03 – .41

X2MY

.21 (.10)

.04 – .44

.19 (.14)

-.04 – .43
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Low Similarity
Mediator

BLM (M)
R2 = .04; F (2,123) = 2.79, p = .065

variable model
b (SE)

T

95% CI

Constant

4.34 (.14)

30.52***

4.05 – 4.62

X1

-.44 (.20)

-2.19*

-.84 – -.04

X2

.37 (.20)

-1.86

-.77 – .02

Dependent
variable model

BA (Y)

PI (Y)

R2 = .19; F (3,122) = 9.72, p < .001

R2 = .07; F (3,116) = 3.26, p = .024

b (SE)

t

95% CI

b (SE)

t

95% CI

Constant

6.65 (.49)

13.47***

5.67 – 7.63

6.01 (.62)

9.71***

4.79 – 7.24

X1

.80 (.24)

3.30**

.32 – 1.28

.60 (.31)

1.95

-.01 – 1.20

X2

.29 (.24)

1.21

-.19 – .77

.33 (.30)

1.08

-.27 – .93

M

-.38 (.11)

-3.54***

-.59 – -.17

-.27 (.13)

-2.00*

-.53 – -.003

Indirect effect

Effect (BootSE)

Boot 95% CI

Effect (BootSE)

Boot 95% CI

X1MY

.17 (.09)

.01 – .37

.12 (.09)

-.02 – .31

X2MY

.14 (.08)

-.004 – .32

.10 (.07)

-.03 – .27

Note. 95% CI indicates a bias-corrected bootstrap (10,000 resamples) confidence interval. X1:
bolstering strategy; X2: differentiation strategy; BLA: blame attribution; BA: brand attitudes; PI:
purchase intentions.
*

p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
H11 predicted that for a high-similarity rival brand, the differentiation strategy compared

to the bolstering strategy would induce more favorable brand attitudes (H11a) and higher
purchase intention (H11b) through the attitudes toward the crisis response message. In predicting
the mediator, both the bolstering strategy (b = .77, SE = .23, t = 3.31, p =.001, 95% BC CI: .31 to
1.23) and differentiation strategy (b = .95, SE = .23, t = 4.07, p < .001, 95% BC CI: .49 to 1.40)
employed by the high-similarity rival brand had significantly positive effects on attitudes toward
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the crisis response message. Attitudes toward the message had a significantly positive effect on
brand attitudes (b = .77, SE = .06, t = 11.86, p < .001, 95% BC CI: .64 to .89). This result
fulfilled the necessary condition to run a mediation analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986).
Furthermore, the direct effect of the differentiation strategy (b = .48, SE = .18, t = 2.72, p =.007,
95% BC CI: .13 to .83) on brand attitudes was significant, whereas that of the bolstering strategy
was not. In testing H11, the indirect effects of the differentiation strategy (effect = .73, BootSE
= .19, BootCI: .36 to 1.11) and bolstering strategy (effect = .59, BootSE = .18, BootCI: .23
to .93) through attitudes toward the message were significant. However, there was no statistically
significant difference between the indirect effects of the differentiation and bolstering strategies
[effects difference (D-B) = .14, BootSE = .17, BootCI: -.18 to .50). Therefore, H11a is not
supported.
In predicting purchase intention, attitudes toward the crisis response message had a
significantly positive effect (b = .82, SE = .10, t = 8.29, p < .001, 95% BC CI: .63 to 1.02).
However, neither of the strategies had a significant direct effect on purchase intention indicating
that attitudes toward the crisis response message fully mediated the relationship between the
crisis response strategy and purchase intention. Furthermore, the indirect effects of the
differentiation strategy (effect = .78, BootSE = .21, BootCI: .39 to 1.22) and bolstering strategy
(effect = .63, BootSE = .21, BootCI: .39 to 1.22) on purchase intention through attitudes toward
the message were significant. However, the difference between the two indirect effects was not
significant (effects difference = .15, BootSE = .19, BootCI: -.19 to .54). Therefore, H11b is not
supported.
H12 predicted that for the low-similarity rival brand, the bolstering strategy would have a
greater positive impact on brand attitudes (H12a) and purchase intention (H12b) through higher
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attitudes toward the crisis response message compared to the differentiation strategy. Prior to
testing H12, I examined the direct effects of the independent variable on the mediator and the
dependent variables as well as the direct effect of the mediator on the dependent variables. The
results showed that both the bolstering strategy (b = 1.12, SE = .23, t = 4.93, p <.001, 95% BC
CI: .67 to 1.57) and differentiation strategy (b = .63, SE = .23, t = 2.75, p = .007, 95% BC CI: .18
to 1.07) had positive direct effects on attitudes toward the message. In predicting brand attitudes,
attitudes toward the crisis response message had a significantly positive effect (b = .84, SE = .06,
t = 13.22, p < .001, 95% BC CI: .72 to .97).
This result fulfilled the necessary condition to observe the mediation (Baron & Kenny,
1986). In testing H12a, the direct effects of the bolstering and differentiation strategies on brand
attitudes were not significant. The indirect effect of the bolstering strategy (effect = .94, BootSE
= .17, BootCI: .63 to 1.27) through attitudes toward the message was significantly greater than
that of the differentiation strategy (effect = .53, BootSE = .21, BootCI: .11 to .94) [effects
difference (B-D) = .42, BootSE = .20, BootCI: .02 to .82]. Therefore, H12a is supported.
In predicting purchase intention, the direct effect of attitudes toward the crisis response
message on purchase intention was significant (b = .79, SE = .10, t = 8.12, p < .001, 95% BC
CI: .60 to .98). The bolstering and differentiation strategies used by the low-similarity rival brand
had no significant direct effect on purchase intention. The indirect effect of the bolstering
strategy (effect = .88, BootSE = .17, BootCI: .56 to 1.25) and differentiation strategy (effect
= .49, BootSE = .21, BootCI: .10 to .92) through attitudes toward the message was significant. A
comparison of the effect size revealed that the difference in the indirect effects between the
bolstering and differentiation strategies was statistically significant [effects difference (B-D)
= .39, BootSE = .19, BootCI: .03 to .80]. Thus, H12b is corroborated.
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Table 12
Study 2: The relative indirect effects of crisis response strategies through attitudes toward the
crisis response message on brand attitudes and purchase intention across different attribute
similarity levels
High Similarity
Mediator

AM (M)
R2 = .13; F (2,123) = 9.37, p < .001

variable model
b (SE)

t

95% CI

Constant

4.88 (.16)

29.72***

4.56 – 5.21

X1

.77 (.23)

3.31**

.31 – 1.23

X2

.95 (.23)

4.07***

.49 – 1.41

Dependent
variable model

BA (Y)

PI (Y)

R2 = .62; F (3,122) = 65.38, p < .001

R2 = .40; F (3,122) = 27.29, p < .001

b (SE)

t

95% CI

b (SE)

t

95% CI

Constant

1.04 (.34)

3.09**

.37 – 1.71

.82 (.52)

1.59

-.20 – 1.84

X1

.26 (.17)

1.48

-.09 – .60

-.11 (.27)

-.43

-.64 – .41

X2

.48 (.17)

2.72**

.13 – .83

.14 (.27)

.52

-.39 – .68

M

.77 (.06)

11.86***

.64 – .89

.82 (.10)

8.29***

.63 – 1.02

Indirect effect

Effect (BootSE)

Boot 95% CI

Effect (BootSE)

Boot 95% CI

X1MY

.59 (.18)

.23 – .93

.63 (.20)

.25 – 1.05

X2MY

.73 (.19)

.36 – 1.11

.78 (.21)

.39 – 1.22

Low Similarity
Mediator

AM (M)
R2 = .17; F (2,123) = 12.20, p < .001

variable model
b (SE)

t

95% CI

Constant

4.87 (.16)

30.32***

4.55 – 5.19

X1

1.12 (.23)

4.93***

.67 – 1.57

X2

.64 (.23)

2.75***

.18 – 1.07

BA (Y)

PI (Y)
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Dependent
variable model

R2 = .63; F (3,122) = 70.51, p < .001

R2 = .38; F (3,122) = 24.86, p < .001

b (SE)

t

95% CI

b (SE)

t

95% CI

Constant

.90 (.33)

2.72**

.25 – 1.55

1.00 (.50)

1.98*

.003 – 2.00

X1

.03 (.18)

.15

-.32 – .37

-.17 (.27)

-.63

-.70 – .36

X2

-.09 (.17)

-.55

-.42 – .24

-.07 (.25)

-.26

-.57 – .43

M

.84 (.06)

13.22***

.72 – .97

.79 (.10)

8.12***

.60 – .98

Indirect effect

Effect (BootSE)

Boot 95% CI

Effect (BootSE)

Boot 95% CI

X1MY

.93 (.17)

.63 – 1.27

.88 (.17)

.56 – 1.25

X2MY

.53 (.21)

.11 – .94

.49 (.21)

.10 – .92

Note. 95% CI indicates a bias-corrected bootstrap (10,000 resamples) confidence interval. X1:
bolstering strategy; X2: differentiation strategy; AM: attitudes toward the crisis response
message; BA: brand attitudes; PI: purchase intention.
*

p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Discussion of Study 2
Consistent with Study 1, the results of Study 2 showed that the perception of the crisis
and negative emotions toward the brand in crisis were transferred to the rival brands within the
same industry. Specifically, compared to participants exposed to no crisis news, participants who
were made aware of the crisis had a higher perception of the crisis and more negative emotions
toward the brand in crisis. They also had a higher perception of the crisis and more negative
emotions toward rival brands that were highly similar to the brand in crisis. In contrast to the
results of Study 1, participants in Study 2 who were made aware of crisis also had a higher
perception of the crisis and negative emotions for rival brands with low attribute similarity than
participants who were not exposed to the crisis news. This result suggests that in Study 2, rival
brands were affected by negative spillover effects regardless of their attribute similarity to the
crisis-stricken brand. Furthermore, participants’ perception of the crisis and negative emotions
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were not significantly lower for the low-similarity rival brand than the high-similarity rival
brand. Although this finding is not consistent with Study 1, it supports the presumption proposed
in the discussion of Study 1. Negative spillover effects occur when people perceive that the rival
brand and the brand in crisis have a specific attribute that is highly similar and is perceived as the
cause of the crisis, called crisis attribute (Roehm & Tybout, 2006). In Study 2, participants
appeared to attribute the same blame to the fintech company and the other traditional in the
context of massive debit card fraud. They may have concluded that the fintech company is just as
vulnerable to debit card fraud as traditional banks. In other words, the potential for large-scale
debit card fraud for fintech companies is similar to that of traditional banks. Participants in Study
2 may have thought that it would be as difficult for the fintech company to prevent debit card
fraud as it would be for traditional banks. Although fintech companies and traditional banks
differ in several service features, they are perceived to be similar in the attribute that leads to
debit card fraud.
Second, Study 2 also found that rival brands can better protect themselves from a
negative spillover effect by issuing a response instead of no response. Consistent with Study 1,
using denial, bolstering, or differentiation strategies can help the rival brand induce more
favorable brand attitudes than having no response. In addition, both the bolstering and
differentiation strategies can effectively increase people’s purchase intention compared to no
response.
Unlike Study 1, the interaction effect between the two crisis response strategies and
attribute similarity on brand attitudes was observed in Study 2. I argued that the perceived
attribute similarity of the rival brand to the crisis-stricken brand would serve as the contextual
cue for participants to make subsequent judgments about the brand based on the rival brand’s
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crisis response message. In a high-similarity situation, the rival brand should employ the
differentiation strategy to pursue the contrast effect to eliminate the contextual cue of high
similarity. In the low-similarity situation, the rival brand should use the bolstering strategy to
achieve an assimilation effect with the contextual cue of low similarity. This finding is consistent
with my prediction. For the high-similarity rival brand, the differentiation strategy leads to
significantly more favorable brand attitudes than the bolstering strategy. In contrast, when the
rival brand has low attribute similarity compared to the brand in crisis, using the bolstering
strategy results in more positive brand attitudes than using the differentiation strategy.
Study 2 also found that blame attribution and attitudes toward the crisis response message
plays a significant mediating role in the relationship between the crisis response strategy and
brand attitude. This finding suggests that rival brands can maintain their consumers’ brand
attitudes and avoid negative spillover effects by employing both the bolstering and
differentiation strategies to reduce consumers’ blame attribution and increase their favorable
attitudes toward the rival brand’s crisis response messages. Study 2 did not find an indirect effect
of the crisis response strategy on purchase intention through lower blame attribution in the
fintech company group. Thus, it appears that compared to brand attitudes, purchase intention is
affected by more factors, which makes it more difficult to change consumers’ perceptions by
issuing a one-time message.
This study also compared the indirect effects of the bolstering and differentiation
strategies on the two dependent variables. For the high-similarity brand, the differentiation
strategy did not significantly positively impact brand attitudes and purchase intention through
blame attribution or attitudes toward the crisis response message compared to the bolstering
strategy. This finding is consistent with Study 1. However, unlike Study 1, the bolstering strategy
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employed by the low-similarity brand resulted in significantly greater positive effects on brand
attitudes and purchase intention through attitudes toward the crisis response message than the
differentiation strategy. This finding implies that for the high-similarity rival brand, there is little
difference between the two strategies in reducing blame attribution and increasing consumers’
evaluations of a favorable message. However, for the low-similarity rival brand, the bolstering
strategy is far better than the differentiation strategy in reducing blame attribution and increasing
consumers’ evaluations of a favorable message.
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Chapter 6: General Discussion
A spillover crisis is like a wildfire. Without properly handling the crisis, the fire has the
potential to burn the whole mountain. Similarly, a spillover crisis appears to have adverse
consequences and implications that extend far beyond the boundaries of the brand in crisis.
However, crisis communication scholars have not paid adequate attention to spillover crises, and
thus practitioners still believe in the advice of conventional wisdom: do not make any
comparisons with the brand in crisis. However, little research has provided alternative guidance
on what brands can do to mitigate negative spillover effects. To fill this important gap in the
literature, the current study examined a negative spillover effect from a brand in crisis to brands
within the same industry in the context of corporate ability crises. The study also tested the
efficacy of different types of crisis response strategies to protect their brands from the negative
effects of spillover crises.
The current study conceptualizes spillover as the transfer of perceptual and emotional
evaluations from the brand in crisis and its rival brands. A spillover crisis is operationally
defined as a situation in which the perceived crisis and negative emotions toward a rival brand of
the crisis-stricken brand are greater for people who read (or are aware of) crisis news than those
who have not read the crisis news. The results of the two experiments in this study are
summarized below.
Summary of Key Findings
There are four key finding from Study 1 and Study 2. First, this study finds empirical
evidence for a negative spillover effect from one brand to rival brands in two different service
failure crises. The study compared participants’ crisis perceptions and negative emotions toward
a rival brand when they were exposed to crisis news and when they were not exposed to the
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crisis news. Furthermore, since the strength of the association due to perceived attribute
similarity could impact the magnitude of negative spillover effects according to associative
network theory, this study tested the negative spillover effects for high- versus low-similarity
brands to the crisis-stricken brand. In Study 1, participants’ crisis perceptions and negative
emotions toward the high-similarity rival brand were far greater than toward the low-similarity
rival brand, in fact, the latter experienced no spillover crisis effect. In contrast, in Study 2, both
high- and low-similarity brands were affected by the negative spillover effect, and no difference
was found in the magnitude of the effect for brands with different similarity levels.
Second, when there were negative spillover effects, rival brands that used the denial,
bolstering, or differentiation strategies performed better than brands with no response, and
participants had more favorable brand attitudes. Although there were no negative spillover
effects on the low-similarity rival brand in Study 1, both the bolstering and differentiation
strategies still had positive effects on participants’ brand attitudes and purchase intention,
whereas the denial strategy was not more effective than no response.
Third, the results of Study 2 revealed interaction effects between crisis response
strategies and attribute similarity. Most notably, the results showed that it was better for the highsimilarity rival brand to use a differentiation strategy than a bolstering strategy. The purpose of
the differentiation strategy is combat participants’ perceptions of the similarity between the two
brands and highlight the differences. In contrast, the results showed that low-similarity rival
brands would be better off using the bolstering strategy to better protect the brand. The bolstering
strategy could help the low-similarity rival brand achieve an assimilation effect when people
initially perceive differences between the two brands. When pursuing an assimilation effect, the
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bolstering strategy can help the rival brand reinforce people’s perceptions that the two brands are
different.
Lastly, both Study 1 and Study 2 demonstrated that crisis response strategies have
indirect effects on brand attitudes and purchase intention through blame attribution and attitudes
toward the response message. The results suggested that responding to a spillover crisis using
either a bolstering or differentiation strategy can reduce people’s blame attribution to the rival
brand, which, in turn, would lead to more favorable brand attitudes. Notably, these findings on
brand attitudes applied to both high- and low-similarity rival brands. However, in Study 1, no
significant indirect effect through blame attribution was found for purchase intention in the lowsimilarity group, probably because there was no spillover effect for the low-similarity rival
brand. In Study 2, the mediating role of blame attribution was not significant for the highsimilarity group, possibly because both rival brands in the different levels of attribute similarity
in the crisis scenario of Study 2 may have been perceived to be equally vulnerable to digital
hacking regardless of the type of banking (i.e., fintech and traditional banks). In addition, both
high- and low-similarity brands in Study 2 could promote favorable attitudes toward the response
message, which resulted in favorable brand attitudes and higher purchase intention. The attitudes
toward the message fully mediated the relationship between the response strategy and the two
dependent variables. Compared with the no-response strategy, both the bolstering and
differentiation strategies performed more effectively in reducing participants’ blame attribution
as well as increasing their favorable message attitudes.
Study 2 also showed that the bolstering strategy had a greater indirect effect on brand
attitudes and purchase intention for the low-similarity rival brand than the differentiation strategy
by increasing people’s positive message attitudes. However, the indirect effects of the two
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strategies through blame attribution were not significantly different, and these findings were not
found in Study 1 in which no spillover effect was found for the low-similarity brand. In both
Study 1 and Study 2, no statistical difference was found for the high-similarity rival brand in
terms of a direct effect of either of the two strategies on the two mediators (i.e., blame attribution
and attitudes toward the message). These results suggest that rival brands can reduce people’s
blame attribution by using either strategy when the rival brand shares highly similar
product/service attributes with the brand in crisis. In contrast, the low-similarity rival brand is
better off using the bolstering strategy to promote more favorable attitudes toward the response
message, and thereby generate more positive effects on brand attitudes and purchase intention.
The two strategies have similar effects in promoting favorable attitudes toward the message for
the high-similarity rival brand.
Theoretical Implications
This research makes unique contributions to the literature on crisis communication in the
context of a brand spillover crisis. Overall, this study is a timely response to the call for research
on spillover crises. This study extends the scope of crisis communication research beyond the
brand in crisis to other brands associated with the brand in crisis. In doing so, the current study
rethinks the relationship between crisis response strategies and types of crises as determined by
crisis responsibility in mainstream crisis communication theory. The findings suggest that the
perception of the association between two brands is a central concept in explaining and
responding to spillover crises. The choice of crisis response strategy for spillover crises should
be based on the type and strength of the perceived association. I believe this study opens up a
new avenue for future research on brand spillover crises.
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Second, this research offers a more systematic way to define a spillover crisis, defined as
a perceived crisis and negative emotions that are smaller for the rival brand than for the brand in
crisis. However, these perceptions and emotions were significantly higher than those of the
control group. This definition addresses an important aspect of the spillover crisis that was not
considered in Veil et al.’s (2016) conceptual article and opens a new avenue for future research
on brand spillover crises. Methodologically, the results suggest that researchers examining a
brand spillover effect need to compare people’s crisis perceptions and negative emotions about
the brand in crisis as well as its rival brands when they are exposed to crisis news and, at the
same time, compare people’s perceptions and emotions who are not exposed to the crisis
situation.
Third, the current study confirms that the perception of similarity is a necessary condition
for a negative spillover effect (Borah & Tellis, 2016; Dahlén & Lange, 2006; Janakiraman et al.,
2009; Roehm & Tybout, 2006; Sahni, 2016; Wu et al., 2020; Yu et al., 2008). But the overall
attribute similarity alone does not provide a sufficient reason for a negative spillover effect. The
key determinant of a negative spillover effect is the similarity in crisis attribute (i.e., a particular
product/service attribute that has caused the crisis). People make inferences about the rival
brands based on this crisis attribute to determine whether there could be a similar crisis for the
rival brand. For example, in Study 1, the crisis attribute was controllability over a rental property
by the brand in crisis. Unlike hotels (i.e., low-similarity brand), the online platform for listing
and renting individual homes does not have full control over the rental property. I believe that
this difference caused the participants in Study 1 to perceive hotels as being less vulnerable to
the same privacy scandal compared to the home-rental brand in crisis. In Study 2, the crisis
attribute is the technology used in debit cards (e.g., EMV chip, magstripes). Even though the
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technology of debit card security has been improving, the banking system is still vulnerable to
potential hacking. Thus, a negative spillover effect could occur for both a fintech company and a
traditional bank. The findings support the diagnosticity principle discussed in Broniarczyk and
Alba (1994) who asserted that diagnosticity relies more on a specific attribute similarity than
global similarity. This finding is also consistent with Roehm and Tybout (2006), in that the
similarity in crisis attribute determines the diagnosticity of the crisis-stricken brand to the rival
brands; therefore, it is a key determinant of a spillover crisis.
The research also advances the scholarly discussion about the important role of crisis
communication in mitigating the negative impacts of a brand spillover crisis. In addition to
studying the efficacy of the denial strategy, the current study investigated the efficacy of the
bolstering and differentiation strategies. The findings are consistent with the findings of Zhang
and Lim (2021) in that issuing an official response using either the bolstering or differentiation
strategy could lead to more favorable brand attitudes and purchase intention than no response
during a spillover crisis. The findings also echo the conclusion of Lee and Rim (2017) that
communicating crisis information with the public is more effective in mitigating negative
spillover effects, and it is even better than action strategies such as ending a partnership. The
reasoning is simple. No matter which strategy is employed, crisis response messages help the
public construct and adjust information to alleviate their uncertainty about the crisis situation and
calm their nerves (Coombs, 2007; Kim & Liu, 2012). In addition, all three strategies give rival
brands a chance to correct people’s initial inference about the rival brand based on attribute
similarities implying that they may also be involved in the same crisis.
In addition, the current research sheds light on two pathways by which response
strategies lead to favorable brand attitudes and higher purchase intention. First, the current
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research showed that blame attribution was important in mediating the effect of a crisis response
strategy on the two outcomes. Notably, for a blame attribution toward a rival brand, people
evaluate if the rival brand shares high similarity with the crisis-stricken brand in the crisis
attribute and they infer whether the rival brand will be involved in a similar crisis in the future.
The higher the blame attribution, the more people think that the rival brand is more vulnerable
and has less controllability over the crisis attribute. This result supports the findings of previous
studies indicating that blame attributions play a critical role in mitigating the spillover effects
(Carrillat et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2021; Lim & Shim, 2019; Votola & Unnava, 2006). The
findings of the current research suggest that crisis response messages from the rival brand should
be able to effectively reduce the blame attribution for the rival brand. Similar to Mackenzie et
al.’s (1986) advertising effectiveness research in which attitudes toward an ad mediated the
effect of advertising on brand attitudes and purchase intention, the current research found that
attitudes toward the response message mediated the effect of a crisis response strategy on brand
attitudes and purchase intention and it was a stronger mediator than blame attribution.
Managerial Implications
The findings of this study can guide public relations professionals who need to manage
unexpected and disruptive situations as a result of a spillover crisis. Managers can learn from the
findings of this research. First, when a brand is facing a crisis, rival brands in the same industry
should assess whether they will experience a spillover crisis. In addition to assessing how similar
they are with the crisis-stricken brand in terms of their product/service, rival brands should pay
special attention to the crisis attribute. If the rival brand shares the same crisis attribute, it is more
vulnerable to a negative spillover effect and thus must quickly prepare a crisis response message.
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Second, managers can consider different types of responses including denial, bolstering,
and differentiation strategies to reduce a negative spillover effect. The model proposed in Figure
1 suggests that managers should consider their product/service attribute similarity and market
position. It is an important takeaway for rival brands with high attribute similarity to mitigate the
damage to consumers’ brand attitudes and purchase intention. The findings indicate that using
the differentiation strategy is more effective. For rival brands with low attribute similarity, the
bolstering strategy outperformed the differentiation strategy in promoting favorable brand
attitudes and purchase intention. However, rival brands should use the denial strategy with
caution. Although it can be effective in mitigating a negative spillover effect compared to no
response, the information provided in a simple denial is very limited. As Veil and Dillingham
(2020) found in Nissan’s spillover crisis caused by Chevy Volt’s fire investigation, a simple
denial without providing further information about the differences of the two brands was less
effective in quelling people’s concerns. In the worst case, a denial strategy can raise suspicion
about if the brand actually engaged in the denied event, leading to a boomerang effect (Roehm &
Tybout, 2006).
Limitations and Future Direction
Despite the theoretical and managerial contributions of the current study, some
limitations should be addressed in future research. First, this study examined only the brand
spillover crisis caused by a service failure, limiting the application of the findings to other types
of crises (e.g., CSR crisis). In explaining the negative spillover effects caused by CSR crises,
similar product/service attributes may no longer be the major factor influencing a spillover effect
and the effectiveness of a crisis response. Further endeavors should investigate what causes a
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negative effect of a CSR crisis to spill over to another brand and how the negative effects can be
mitigated.
Second, it should be acknowledged that this research focuses only on negative spillover
effects within the industry that result from the perceived similarity of their product/service
attributes. The reason for the focus on similarity is that individuals judge brand associations
primarily based on similarity (Punj & Moon, 2002). However, the perceived association between
two brands can be formed in various ways. I suggest that future research that should make efforts
to identify more generalizable crisis communication strategies for different types of spillover
crises due to different associations. For example, perceived associations between brands can
caused by context-specific traits. Broniarczyk and Alba (1994) pointed out that milk, spinach,
and sardines can be associated together because they are high in calcium. Future research may
consider examining if negative spillover effects could occur due to this type of “single relational
match” (Broniarczyk & Alba, 1994, p. 215) and determine how it should be managed.
Extending this idea, further research may also benefit from testing spillover crises due to
reputation interdependence among brands. It is a common practice for brands to join strategic
groups to pursue a competitive advantage (Ferguson et al., 2000). A brand’s strategic group
identity could include joining a trade association (e.g., American Peanut Council), being certified
in an industry-standard (e.g., Leaping Bunny), and endorsing a value (e.g., fair trade) or social
movement. A favorable collective reputation of a strategic group (Finch et al., 2013; Winn et al.,
2008) could provide a tremendous competitive advantage for a brand (Norheim-Hansen, 2015;
Stuart, 1998). For example, “German engineering” has become a symbol of quality, safety, and
innovation for German cars. However, when a crisis threatens the collective reputation, the
reputational interdependence can rapidly signal trouble (Veil & Dillingham, 2020). In the
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Volkswagen diesel scandal, the intertwined images and reputations of all German car brands,
made it difficult for the brands to separate other German companies from Volkswagen’s crisis
(Bachmann et al., 2019). Future research should examine this context and test the relative
efficacy of the three response strategies.
Third, the study conducted a mediation analysis using a composite index for blame
attribution although blame attribution was measured on the dimensions of locus of cause,
stability, and controllability. It is beyond the scope of the current study to further examine the
effects of a crisis response strategy on each of the three dimensions. However, future studies
should consider examining them separately to advance our understanding of the effects of the
crisis response strategy on the causal explanation of the crisis.
Additionally, in explaining the efficacy of crisis response strategies, the study only
examined changes in people’s crisis perceptions based on the response message. However, the
elicited emotions in response to a crisis response message also influence the efficacy of the crisis
response strategies (Jin, 2014; Kim & Cameron, 2011). Future research should consider testing
the roles of various discrete emotions, such as empathy, in mitigating spillover crises. Previous
research has indicated that consumers’ blame attribution is closely related to their empathy
towards a brand or spokesperson (McCullough et al., 1997; Schoofs et al., 2019). When
consumers perceive that a brand is a victim or is less responsible for a negative event, a strategic
response message will promote empathy towards a brand or its spokesperson, which, in turn, can
protect consumers’ brand evaluations.
Last, the current study finds that the crisis attribute seems to affect the relative efficacy of
crisis response strategies. In Study 1, the differentiation strategies used by the rival brand that
has a high similarity in crisis attributes with the crisis-stricken brand did not produce the contrast
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effect. It might be because people did not believe that these brands could do differently in terms
of the crisis attribute. Further studies are needed to understand the influence of the crisis attribute
on the efficacy of crisis response strategies.
Final thoughts
One brand’s risk and misfortune can be a great opportunity for its competitors. At the
beginning of this study, I described the problem with this statement: ignoring the potential
negative spillover effects of one brand’s crisis affects other brands. I want to conclude this study
by supporting this statement. A brand’s susceptibility to spillover crises highlights the
vulnerability of an entire industry. As Veil et al. (2012) suggested, exposed vulnerabilities come
with opportunities. A crisis provides opportunities for organizational learning and adaptation
(Bundy et al., 2017; Duchek, 2019). If individual brands will proactively address these
vulnerabilities and learn from a spillover crisis, the industry can help prevent similar disruptive
events and even create new competitive advantages for the industry at large (Vogus & Sutcliffe,
2007). Therefore, instead of remaining invisible, brands should be more active in responding to a
crisis when there is a spillover crisis.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Measurements for key variables
Measures
Perceived Crisis
PC1. This situation would be difficult to deal with.
PC2. The potential impact of this situation seems to be very severe.
PC3. It would be very time-consuming for the company to respond to this type of issue.
PC4. This situation would last a long time if immediate action were not taken.
Negative emotion
NE1: unpleasant
NE2: downhearted
NE3: unhappy
NE4: scared
NE5: fearful
NE6: afraid
NE7: nervous
NE8: anxious
NE9: worried
Blame Attribution for the rival brand
Locus:
BLA1: I think [rival brand]’s security and privacy policies would cause the same incident.
BLA2: I think [rival brand]’s regulations on safety and privacy would cause the same incident.
BLA3: I think [rival brand] should be blamed if the same incident would occur to them.
BLA4: I think [rival brand] should be responsible if the same incident would occur to them.
Stability:
BLA5: I think this incident is a common occurrence at [rival brand].
BLA6: I think this incident can also happen at [rival brand].
BLA7: I think this incident is likely to happen at [rival brand].
Controllability:
BLA8: I think [rival brand] is able to control the occurrence of this incident in advance.
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BLA9: I think [rival brand] could prevent this from happening in advance.
BLA10: I think [rival brand] could avoid this incident.
Attitudes toward the crisis response message
AM1: negative/positive
AM2: not likable/likable
AM3: unfavorable/favorable
AM4: unpleasant/pleasant
AM5: bad/good
Brand Attitudes
BA1: negative/positive
BA2: not likable/likable
BA3: unfavorable/favorable
BA4: unpleasant/pleasant
BA5: bad/good
Purchase Intention
PI1: unlikely/likely
PI2: not possible/possible
PI3: improbable/probable
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Appendix B. Study 1 experiment stimuli
1. Online article indicating attribute similarity
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2. Crisis news
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3. Crisis response message
Denial-high similarity
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4. Denial-low similarity
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5. Bolstering-high similarity
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6. Bolstering-low similarity
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7. Differentiation-high similarity
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8. Differentiation-low similarity
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Appendix C. Study 2 experiment stimuli
1. Online article indicating attribute similarity-high similarity
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2. Online article indicating attribute similarity-low similarity
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3. Crisis news
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4. Crisis response message
Denial-high similarity
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5. Denial-low similarity
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6. Bolstering-high similarity
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7. Bolstering-low similarity
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8. Differentiation-high similarity
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9. Differentiation-low similarity
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Appendix D. Informed consent and Debriefing
1. Informed Consent
Informed consent
You are invited to take part in a research study conducted by Jun Zhang, a graduate
student at S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications in Syracuse University. The purpose
of this research study is to examine people’s perceptions and attitudes towards a brand’s
message.
You will participate in an online experiment and be asked to complete an online
questionnaire in a place where you are connected to the internet via any computer, smartphone,
or tablet. This study will take approximately 12 minutes of your time. Upon your voluntary
participation, you will be asked to answer several questions that measure your perceptions,
attitudes, and behavioral responses to a brand’s message. Please note that there is some
information will be withheld from you until the study is completed.
You will be given credit from Mturk after the completion of this study as compensation.
There are minimal risks associated with this study. You will have the right to withdraw
from the study at any time, as well as the option to not answer questions you may feel
uncomfortable about. If you do not want to participate, you have the right to refuse to take part,
without penalty. If you decide to take part and later no longer wish to continue, you have the
right to withdraw from the study at any time.
All information will be kept completely confidential. Any of your identifiable
information, such as names and email addresses, will not be collected. You will never be
identified in any presentations or papers that we might submit for publication.
Whenever one works with email or the Internet; there is always the risk of compromising
privacy, confidentiality, and/or anonymity. Your confidentiality will be maintained to the degree
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permitted by the technology being used. It is important for you to understand that no guarantees
can be made regarding the interception of data sent via the internet by third parties.
You will receive no direct benefits from participating in this research study. However,
this research may provide you with an understanding of crisis response messages in brand crises.
If you have any questions, concerns, or more information regarding this research, you
may contact Jun Zhang, a graduate student at S.I. Newhouse School of Public CommunicationsSyracuse University (email: jzhan18@syr.edu).
If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, you may
contact the Syracuse University Institutional Review Board at (315) 443-3013.
Please print a copy of this consent form for your records.

I am 18 years of age or older and I understand what my participation in this research
involves. I have printed a copy of this form for my personal records.

By continuing I agree to participate in this research study.
(1) Yes
(2) No

2. Debriefing
Study 1:
Thanks for your participation in this experiment. The goal of this study was to examine the
effects of crisis response strategies on reducing negative perceptions and attitudes toward a
related brand. To minimize the unintended effects of using real brand names, all the brand names
in the experiment are fictitious. The news story regarding the hidden camera incident and crisis
response messages are fictitious as well. Please note that you have the option to withdraw your
data if you would like to. Finally, we urge you not to discuss this study with anyone else who is
currently participating or might participate at a future point in time.
If you have any questions about this study, please contact us (jzhan18@syr.edu) or contact the
Syracuse University Institutional Review Board at 315-443-3013.
Thanks again for your participation.

Do you want to submit your results?
A. Yes B. No
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Study 2:
Thanks for your participation in this experiment. The goal of this study was to examine the
effects of crisis response strategies on reducing negative perceptions and attitudes toward a
related brand. To minimize the unintended effects of using real brand names, all the brand names
in the experiment are fictitious. The news story regarding the massive debit card fraud and crisis
response messages are fictitious as well. Please note that you have the option to withdraw your
data if you would like to. Finally, we urge you not to discuss this study with anyone else who is
currently participating or might participate at a future point in time.
If you have any questions about this study, please contact us (jzhan18@syr.edu) or contact the
Syracuse University Institutional Review Board at 315-443-3013.
Thanks again for your participation.

Do you want to submit your results?
A. Yes B. No
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the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC) 2019
Conference, Toronto, Canada.
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Study of Subjectivity, Naples, Italy.
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Scholarly Awards
2019 Top Student Paper, Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication,
Public Relations Division
2019 Feinberg Dissertation Support Award, Newhouse School of Syracuse University
2013 Graduate Scholarship, Maxwell School of Syracuse University
2010, 2011, 2012 Top Student Scholarship, Zhejiang Gongshang University
Research Experience
Project title: News and Misinformation, Social Sentiment, and Confidence in COVID-19
Vaccines on Twitter
The project is initiated by Prof. Joon Soo Lim, Prof. Hua Jiang, Prof. Beth Egan, and Prof.
Rebecca Ortiz at Newhouse School and collaborating with W2O group, a leading social
analytics firm.
Research Assistant

Jan.– May 2021



Assist in study design



Gather, organize, maintain Twitter data using social analytics tools (Social Studio)



Perform data cleaning, analysis, and visualization using Python, texting mining techniques,
Tableau, etc.
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Collect related literature and prepare literature reviews



Assist in writing manuscripts for publications

Project title: Integration of Communication Technologies for Community Health and
Environmental justice
Research Assistant

May 2020–May 2021

The project is funded by Social Science Korea (SSK) Grant (4 years) from the National
Research Foundation of Korea. Principal Investigator: Ghee-young Noh (Hallym University)
w/ Joon Soo Lim et al. as Co-Investigators. Awarded 560,000,000 Korean Won (approximately
$500,000) (September 1, 2018)


Assist with the survey design and revision



Employ a structural equation modeling in Mplus to analyze the data



Participate in writing and revising two academic papers

Project title: The Interactive Effects of Campaign Sponsors and “Myths and Facts”
Message Variations on Correcting Misconceptions about Vaping and Preventing Ecigarette Use Among Young Adults
Research Assistant

May 2019–May 2021

The project is funded by the Collaboration for Unprecedented Success and Excellence Grant
Program from Syracuse University. Principal Investigator: Joon Soo Lim (PI). Awarded
$4,968. (April 2019)


Assist with the study design, survey questionnaire design and revision



Participate in writing the related academic papers

Project title: The Age of AI: Audience Segmentation and Predictive Audience
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Engagement
Research Assistant

May 2019–Nov 2020

The project is funded by The Tow Center Grant at Columbia University. Principal Investigator:
Joon Soo Lim w/ Stephen Masiclat, Regina Luttrell, and Dennis Kinsey as Co-investigators.
Awarded $15,000 (June 1, 2018)


Assisted with designing the main survey and administering survey via Qualtrics



Performed data cleaning and analysis, including neural network analysis, latent class
analysis, path analysis, and mediation analysis



Participated in writing and revising the final report and related academic papers

Research Assistantship, S.I. Newhouse School, Syracuse University


Assisted Prof. Jennifer Grygiel with the project regarding free press May 2020–Aug.2020
and journalism taxonomy



Assisted Prof. Joon Soo Lim with projects regarding brand safety in May 2018–May 2020
programmatic advertising and female empowerment campaign



Assisted Prof. Jennifer Grygiel with projects on law enforcement

May–Aug. 2018

agencies’ use of social media and political memes on social media


Assisted Prof. Rebecca Ortiz with the project regarding sexual

May–Aug. 2018

consent in TV shows
Project title: Social Media Impact Measurement Program
Research Analyst, Center for Social Media Research, Peking

Sept. 2014–Jun. 2017

University
The program was funded by Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to identify key indicators of
social media impact by ongoing case studies and big data analysis, establishing recognized
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measurement structure, and developing related application tools based on structure.


Conducted literature review on frameworks of social media impact measurement



Assisted with identifying impact index and establishing measurement structure



Explored methods to identify key online opinion leaders



Probed feasible ways to build a model for online engagement

Teaching Experience
Instructor of Record
Course: Social Media for Communicators

Jan.–May 2019



Discussed emerging social media technology and strategies



Lectured social media content creation and marketing techniques



Demonstrated social media analytics tools to extract insights from social media data



Led discussion regarding hot topics in the current social media ecology such as privacy and
fake news



Created a group project for students to gain experience with day-to-day social media content
creation, distribution, management, and social media marketing

Teaching Assistant
Course: Public Relations Campaign Planning and Execution

Feb.–May 2021



Assist with course material preparation: campaign cases, news articles, and quizzes



Advice students to develop their campaign plans



Help grade students’ essays and group assignments

Course: Public Relations Research


Jan. 2020– May 2021

Assist with course material preparation: slides, handouts, and quizzes
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Delivered lectures regarding conducting secondary research, using Qualtrics to create and
administer surveys, and performing crosstab analysis via Qualtrics (via Zoom)



Provide advice on students’ group projects in terms of data analysis and visualization (both
in-person and via Zoom)



Grade quizzes and provide feedback on group assignments

Course: Quantitative Methods for Mass Communications Research


Sept.–Dec. 2020

Taught a 6-session hybrid SPSS workshop to equip students with understandings and skills
to perform basic statistical analyses, including descriptive analysis, Chi-square analysis,
correlation, t-test, ANOVA, hierarchical analysis, et al.



Designed six in-class exercises that are closely related to the learning objectives



Advised students’ group projects regarding the data collection, questionnaire design, and
statistical analyses

Course: Social Media for Communicators

Aug.–Dec. 2018



Lectured on social media marketing and advertising



Held office hours for students to discuss assignments, helped prepare exams and quizzes,
graded assignments

Invited Speaker


Good practices for NPOs in using social media. Invited lecture at the Tencent “9.9” Giving
Day Social Media Capacity-Building Workshop for Young NPO Practitioners. Xi’an, China
(July 2017)



Using logic model to guide social media campaigns and impact measurement. Invited
lecture at the Peking University Social Media Impact Measurement Workshop for NPOs.
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Beijing, China (April 2017)
Professional Experience
Center for Social Media Research, Peking University, Beijing, China
Research Analyst


Sept. 2014–July 2017

Conducted social listening and impact measurement projects for Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation (Beijing), Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, and International Organization for
Migration



Led a survey on the use and measurement of social media by nonprofit organizations



Organized two social media capacity-building workshops for nonprofit organizations



Managed a WeChat public accounts with two team members for Baidu Delta Club

Fayetteville- Manlius-A Better Chance
Consultant

May 2013–June 2013

Project to provide tools and resources to help F-M ABC, a nonprofit organization focused on
girls’ education, position itself as a competitive organization in the nonprofit funding market.


Employed benefit theory to analyze F-M ABC funding portfolio and provided a list of
strategic recommendations to reach companies in the community and motivate individual
donors



Clarified F-M ABC’s short-term and long-term goals by using the logic model



Designed alumni outreach survey

Service
Peer Review Activities


Cyberpsychology: Journal of Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace
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International Communication Association Annual Conference

Nov. 2019/2020

Syracuse University Program for Refugee Assistance
Volunteer ESL Teacher


Sept.–Dec. 2013

Provided English language training to refugees.

Say Yes to Education (Syracuse)
Bellevue Elementary School Library Assistant


Aug. 2012–Dec. 2012

Managed school’s library and read stories to children

Certification
Certificate in University Teaching
Syracuse University

Mar. 2020
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